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CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND FAMILY AUTONOMY IN THE
SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT: A COMMENT ON CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS UNDER THE FINAL CONSTITUTION
Tshepo L. Mosikatsana*
This Article investigates the nature and extent of the protection
granted to children's rights in the South African Constitution. It
concludes that the child-centered approach of the Constitution entitles
children, as independent actors, to certain fundamental rights.
Acknowledging both the parent-centered nature of the existing South
African legal framework and the entrenched support for practices,
many rooted in indigenous law and tradition, that contribute to the
oppression of children, the author argues that the constitutionalization
of these rights will contribute to the betterment of children in South
Africa, proving to be more than mere moral exhortation. Under
apartheid in South Africa. children, who were treated only as objects of
parental concern and not as independent actors, were left to the mercy
of the state. As a result, they lost any claim to their fundamental
rights. This Article argues that recognition of the inalienable rights of
children, in fact and not just in the Constitution, is the critical step in
improving children's lives and ensuring the future of a democratic
South Africa. Specifically, constitutionalization provides a basis for
challenging racially structured and parent-centered child welfare laws
and practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Mothers and fathers of South Africa we are the voices of your
children those who live and those yet to be born
We are the undernourished the under-educated, the homeless
and the naked
The voiceless victims of the infant mortality plague that has
seen so many of us young ones buried before reaching the age
of one,
We are your children
We call upon you today,
on our knees we implore you
to please create for us a new day
a new beginning, a new South Africa.'
1. LETTA MBULU, UNrrY SONG (words and music by Caiphus Semenya).
Children's Rights
The 1996 Constitution2 marks a watershed moment in the
process of democratization in South Africa. This event has particular
significance for South Africa's children, as a result of the Constitu-
tion's focus on children's rights in section 28.' The longstanding
acceptance of private or parental responsibility for child welfare in
South African law4 makes the constitutionalization of public or state
responsibility for child welfare such an innovative accomplishment.
The magnitude of the transformation worked by section 28 is most
striking when viewed in contrast to the South African State's histori-
cally antagonistic relationship with children.
Children, particularly Black children,' were the main victims
of human rights violations under the apartheid regime. As one
scholar has noted,
2. S. AFR. CONST.
3. S. AFR. CONST. § 28. Section 28 refined and reinforced the children's rights
clause introduced by section 30 of the interim Constitution. S. AFR. CONST. § 30
(1993).
4. See P.Q.R. BOBERG, THE LAW OF PERSONS AND THE FAMILY 315-17 (1977)
(describing how parental power is acquired and lost in South Africa); Raylene
Kneightley, Children and the Legal System: An Overview of Issues Raised by Contributors,
1996 ACTAJURIDICA 1, 1 (introducing a discussion of the constitutionalization of the
rights of the child).
5. According to apartheid policy, which found expression through the Popula-
tion Registration Act 30 of 1950 (repealed 1991) and Proclamation 123 of 1967, Proc.
R123/1967, a South African child was classified at birth as belonging to one of four
racial categories: Black (referring exclusively to Africans), Colored (mixed-race),
Asian, or White. Id. The first three categories were designated non-White. This classi-
fication determined a child's life prospects, including the child's future health,
education, employment opportunities, and final place of burial (because cemeteries
were segregated as well). Id. The government further reinforced racial segregation by
passing several acts of legislation. See, e.g., Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49
of 1953 (providing for separate public facilities, including restaurants, restrooms, and
transport); Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (providing for segregated residential areas);
Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 55 of 1949 (prohibiting marriages between
Blacks and Whites); and Immorality Act 5 of 1927 (punishing Blacks and Whites who
engage in sexual relations with each other with as much as five years in prison). For
a discussion of the system of racial classification in South Africa, see Alan Mabin,
Comprehensive Segregation: The Origins of the Group Areas Act and Its Planning Appara-
tuses, 18 J. S. AFR. STUD. 405 (1992); see also INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE AND AID FUND
FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA, CHILDREN UNDER APARTHEID 7-8 (1980) (discussing the
plight of interracial children); S.D. Girvin, Race and Race Classification, in RACE AND
THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 1-10 (Allen J. Rycroft ed., 1987) (discussing the delete-
rious effects of the Population Registration Act of 1950); M.K. Robertson, Black Land
Tenure: Disabilities and Some Rights, in RACE AND THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA, supra, at
119, 119-38 (discussing how different racial groups receive differential treatment in
occupation and ownership of immovable property).
6. See June Sinclair, South Africa: Children and Political Violence; Divorce and the
Division of Property, 29 J. FAM. L. 411, 412-13 (1991); see also JOHN KANE-BERMAN,
SOwETO: BLACK REVOLT, WHITE REACTION 41-46 (1978) (describing how officers
could detain prisoners indefinitely without allowing others to have access to them).
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the apartheid regime in South Africa... embarked on a
deliberate campaign of repression directed at African
township children. Although accurate statistics are hard
to achieve, the most reliable count available reports in
the period between 1984 and 1986 that 312 children
were shot dead by the police, another 1,000 or so
wounded, an additional 11,000 detained without trial
and almost invariably tortured, 18,000 more arrested on
charges arising from political activities, and 173,000 held
in police cells supposedly awaiting trials. Although the
notion of child extends until the age of 18, many of the
South African children targeted by the police were far
younger, frequently as young as 11 and even younger
on occasion.
On June 16, 1995, the anniversary of the Soweto uprisings,8
South Africa announced the ratification of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child.9 This act, together with the
inclusion of a section on children's rights in the Constitution,0 pro-
7. Richard Falk, Targeting the Children of South Africa: A New Crime of State, 1
AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 13, 13 (1989); see also Chris Nicholson, Children in Detention,
in EMERGENCY LAW: PAPERS PRESENTED AT A WORKSHOP IN JOHANNESBURG 53-60
(Nicholas Haysom & Laura Mangan eds., 1987).
8. KANE-BERMAN, supra note 6, at 1-10.
On the morning of Wednesday 16 June 1976, twenty thousand
Soweto schoolchildren marched in protest against a decree by the
South African government's Department of Bantu Education that
Afrikaans had to be used as one of the languages of instruction in
secondary schools.... Police vehicles raced to the scene... no or-
der from the police to the marchers to disperse was heard, and a
senior police officer admitted at the time that no warning shots had
been fired either.... The first child to be shot was evidently a thir-
teen-year-old schoolboy called Hector Petersen .... Then, in the
words of one newspaper, 'All hell broke loose.'. . . Within two
months of 16 June, at least 80 black communities all over the coun-
try had expressed their fury; within four months the number had
risen to 160.
Id. at 1-2.
9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/736 (1989) [hereinafter U.N. Convention]. The Convention on the Rights
of the Child transformed general concern with child suffering into public interna-
tional law. Id. In this respect it contrasts with the following two declarations: the
Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1924, adopted by the League of Nations in 1924
(League of Nations Doc. A. 127 (1924)); and the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the
Child 1959 (G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc.
A/4354 (1959)). Declarations proclaim agreed upon principles but are not legally
binding. A U.N. Convention, however, is binding on the countries that ratify it.
10. S. AFR. CONST. § 28.
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vided proof that South Africa had renounced its oppressive past and
would pursue a policy directed at improving child welfare. By
ratifying the Convention, South Africa committed itself to the full
implementation of the rights contained therein." Additionally, the
Constitution's children's rights provision incorporated some of the
provisions of the UN Convention, bringing the influence of interna-
tional human rights jurisprudence into South African law."
Most constitutional democracies, including Canada and the
United States, have no children's rights clause in their constitutions.
Nonetheless, these countries have been able to promulgate laws and
pursue policies that are child-centered.' 3 It is this child-centered
approach, seen by some as a Western approach, that the drafters of
the new Constitution brought to South Africa. An analysis of this
effort to import a child-centered approach into South African law
and of its potential for success in the context of existing legal and
cultural structures is the focus of this paper.
The principal components of the South African legal system are
the common law'4 and statutes. Although customary or indigenous
11. These rights divide into the following three broad categories: 1) Protection:
Children have a right to protection from cruelty, abuse, neglect, and exploitation. 2)
Participation: Children have a right to play an active role in society and to have a say
in their own lives. 3) Provision: Children have a right to have their basic needs met.
See U.N. Convention, supra note 9.
Part of the enforcement mechanism is contained in article 43 of the Conven-
tion, which establishes a committee of independent experts, and article 44, which
places an obligation on state parties to submit periodic reports to the committee on
the status of children's rights in their territory. Id. art. 43, 44. Article 45 permits the
committee to request technical assistance from UNICEF and other specialized agen-
cies. Id. art. 45.
12. The incorporation of international human rights law and international law
into South Africa's municipal law is demonstrated in the Constitution by sections
39(1), 231, 232, and 233. Section 39(1) provides that "[w]hen interpreting the Bill of
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum... must promote the values that underlie an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom . . . must
consider international law... may consider foreign law." S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1).
Section 231 provides that international agreements form part of South African law.
Id. § 231. Section 232 provides that customary international law is part of South
African law. Id. § 232. Section 233 admonishes South African courts to interpret
legislation in a manner consistent with international law. Id. § 233. See also John
Dugard, The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the South African Constitu-
tion, in 49 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 305, 307-12, 322 (Michael Freeman ed., 1996)
(describing the role of international human rights law in development and operation
of New South African democracy).
13. See T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 96 (1995).
"In economically developed, industrialized societies, while self-sufficient individu-
alism is the ideal, children enjoy a privileged position. Biological parents bear full
responsibility for rearing children while... still a minor child's interests are always
preferred to its parents." Id.
14. Common law refers to the Roman-Dutch colonial legal system and judicial
precedent. For a discussion of the common law as a source of law, see DUARD KLEYN
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law must be recognized and treated as a vital part of the legal reality
in South Africa, it has traditionally occupied a position of secondary
importance. 5 The existing network of South African laws and prac-
tices pertaining to the rights of children is not, in theory or reality,
child-centered. Indigenous law is rooted in the protection of the
family, and its focus generally is on the community rather than on
the individual.16 Similarly, much of the common law and the older
statutory law is parent-centered. The most important statute for the
advancement of children's rights in South Africa is the Child Care
Act,18 which, like much of municipal law that addresses the objectives
of section 28, predates the Constitution. Most of the pre-constitutional
child and family welfare laws tended to be patriarchal 9 and also con-
ferred benefits along racial lines.2 Constitutionalization of children's
rights provides independent ideological justification for reforming the
racist and anti-feminist aspects of these laws. Likewise, Section 28
provides an opportunity to enact new laws that foster the demo-
cratic, child-centered goals of the Constitution. This significant
potential for reform notwithstanding, efforts to realize these consti-
tutional promises nevertheless must take place within an existing
legal structure that is hostile to such ideals.
A key question for the success of Section 28 is whether its
child-centered regime is compatible with the communalism of African
& FRANS VILJOEN, BEGINNER'S GUIDE FOR LAW STUDENTS 85-90 (1996); see also
LOURENs M. Du PLESSIS & A.G. DU PLESSIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw 16-75 (1992)
(arguing that it was inevitable that South African law would grow from Roman-
Dutch law); H. R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND
Irs BACKGROUND 329-31 (1968) (outlining the history of South African law as it
relates to Roman-Dutch law); W.J. HosTEN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 337-46 (1995) (discussing Roman-Dutch law at the Cape of
Good Hope from 1652 to 1795).
15. Customary law (also referred to as indigenous law) is derived mainly from
current social practices. According to § 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act
45 of 1988, customary law supplements the common law. The courts have discretion
to apply customary law, which should not be applied if it conflicts with the common
law. Id. For a discussion of the interaction between the common law and customary
law, see BENNETt, supra note 13, at 51-65; see also KLEYN & VILJOEN, supra note 14, at
93-94 (comparing the common law to customary law); HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 14,
at 1248-69 (arguing for the use of the comparative method when looking at indige-
nous law and the common law).
16. HOSTEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1259-61.
17. Id. at 616-20.
18. Act 74 of 1983 as amended by the Child Care Amendment Act 96 of 1996. For
a discussion of the Child Care Act, see H. M. BOSMAN-SWANEPOEL & P.J. WESSELS, A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE CHILD CARE ACT (J. J. Scherman, Trans., 1995).
19. See J. Julyan, Women, Race and the Law, in RACE AND THE LAW IN SOUTH
AFRICA, supra note 5, at 139, 143.
20. See K. Govender, Race and Social Rights, in RACE AND THE LAW IN SOUTH
AFRICA, supra note 5, at 229, 231.
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culture.2'1 Specifically, we do not yet know whether the fact that sec-
tion 28 borrows heavily from the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child means that the Constitution contains an individualistic
concept of rights, founded in Western liberalism, that is incompati-
ble with an African communalistic way of living.
One potential conflict between indigenous law and the child-
centered norms trumpeted in the Constitution concerns the age of
majority. Under indigenous law there are neither fixed criteria for
determining the status of childhood nor a set age for the attainment
of majority. The attainment of majority under indigenous law de-
pends largely on physical and intellectual maturity, initiation,
marriage, and the establishment of a separate household.'2 Both the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Constitution state
that adulthood begins at age eighteen.24 The Convention does not
compel states to pass legislation fixing an age of majority; conse-
quently, there is no international legal basis for introducing a
specific age for the termination of minority under indigenous law.'
This constitutional conflict could have serious practical impli-
cations. T.W. Bennett argues that, because the attainment of majority
under indigenous law does not depend on the attainment of a pre-
determined age, a child's legal status could be manipulated by its
guardian to withhold certain rights that come with majority. In
such an event, sections 9 (3 )fl and 28(2)2' of the Constitution could be
21. "The African tradition is quite different. Here the welfare of the extended.
family predominates. Children have no especially favored position in relation to
their parents or other relatives; to the contrary, a child's interests might well be
subordinated to those of the family." BENNETT, supra note 13, at 96 (footnotes omit-
ted).
22. See J. C. Bekker, Children and Young Persons in Indigenous Law, in THE LAW OF
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 190-92 (J.A. Robinson ed., 1997);
BENNETt, supra note 13, at 101-02.
23. Bekker, supra note 22, at 191; see also BENNETr, supra note 13, at 101-02
(discussing various criteria for determining the status of childhood in South Africa).
24. Article 1 of the U.N. Convention states that "a child means every human
being below the age of eighteen years." U.N. Convention, supra note 9, at art. 1. Section
28(3) of the Constitution states that the word "child" "means a person under the age
of 18 years." S. AFR. CONsT. § 28(3).
25. Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972 could achieve this purpose, but the courts
have not applied the Act consistently. See BENNETT, supra note 13, at 102.
26. BENNETt, supra note 12, at 102.
27. This section prohibits discrimination on the basis of age. S. AFR. CONsT.
§ 9(3).
28. This section makes the child's best interests paramount in all matters con-
cerning the child. S. AFR. CONsT. § 28(2). For a discussion of the best interests
standard in South African law, see generally Anne Palmer, The Best Interests Crite-
rion: An Overview of its Application in Custody Decisions Relating to Divorce in the Period
1985-1995, 1996 ACTAJURIDICA 98; Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, Gay/Lesbian Adoptions and
the Best Interests Standard: A Critical Analytical Perspective, 1996 ACrAJURIDICA 114.
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invoked to modify parent-child relations under indigenous law in
order to attain a more favorable situation for the child." Bennett
asserts that a strict application of the Age of Majority Act, or some
other instrument reflecting international law and its embodiment in
the South African Constitution would be insufficient.30 Bennett be-
lieves in the need for a system to regulate the control of family
property, best achieved through statute, that would lead to protec-
tion of children's interests through detailed planning and careful
deliberation.3 Thus, the claims of competing legal systems may once
again require children to rely on the political process to protect their
rights.
Though increased allocation of resources to children's care
and education can improve these children's life prospects, chil-
dren's interests cannot be met fully unless the children are treated
as independent legal subjects rather than as objects of adult con-
cern.32 The argument that providing rights for children necessarily
will have a negative impact on the family as a unit is misguided
because it relies on an anachronistic model of society that focuses
solely on adults. The framers of the new Constitution rejected this
model by including Section 28. They recognized that children's
entitlement to protection of their human rights is not weaker be-
cause they are not adults. The phrase "children's rights" is
appropriate because children have been excluded in the same
manner as women and, in a similar fashion, have been denied
certain fundamental rights. The difficulty with granting children
rights is that their physical, emotional, and intellectual immaturity
cause dependence on adults to assist children in exercising those
29. The application of the Constitution to parent/child relations is made possible
by section 9(4), which provides for the horizontal application of constitutional provi-
sions. For a discussion of the horizontal application of the Constitution, see De Kierk
v. Du Plessis, 1995 (2) SA 40 (T); see also Baloro v. University of Bophuthatswana, 1995
(2) SA 197 (B); M.L.M. Mbao, The Province of the South African Bill of Rights Determined
and Redetermined-A Comment on the Case of Baloro & Others v. University of Bophuthat-
swana & Others, 113 S. AFR. L.J. 33-45 (1996) (arguing that a definitive judgment has
yet to be handed down on the question of whether the Bill of Rights extends to em-
brace infractions of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the bill involving ordinary
individuals).
30. BENNETr, supra note 13, at 104-05. Bennett states that "[ilf the courts were
simply to apply the Law of Majority Act to Africans, some of the inequities of the
current regime could be remedied by putting an end to a person's incapacity at a
reasonable age. More, however, is needed." Id. Bennett's belief that "more ... is
needed" stems from his conviction that indigenous and customary law must be
integrated carefully into the new South African legal structure, recognizing the
different problems that the alteration of each separate practice raises. Id. at 104.
31. Id.
32. PENELOPE LEACH, CHILDREN FIRsT 203 (1994).
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rights, unlike other rights recipients such as women.3 As Onora
O'Neill has written, the fact that children "cannot claim their rights
for themselves.., is no reason for denying them rights. Rather it is
reason for setting up institutions that can monitor those who have
children in their charge and intervene to enforce rights."
3'
Another potential concern involves the effect that a child-
centered approach would have on the family. Is it appropriate to
give children rights without cementing their obligations to their
families? Does the protection of children's rights without protecting
the family as a basic unit erode family autonomy?
A child-centered approach to children's rights may have a
Western origin, but it has been incorporated into the South African
Constitution and can and should be enforced within South African
society.
I. THEORETICAL BASIS FOR CONSTITUTIONALIZING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
This article examines childhood from a critical analytical per-
spective, adopting a non-traditional, child-centered approach that
studies childhood as a discrete social phenomenon rather than a part
of the family institution. To overcome some of the limitations of a
formalistic approach to the study of childhood, this Article employs
a socio legal perspective that integrates commonly segregated disci-
plines such as law, sociology, and political science.
Most social theories of children's studies are parent-centered.35
Such theories rely upon the positivist functionalist approach that
studies children as the concern of adults.3 This approach seeks to
provide a context for the study of childhood. Noted social scientist
Talcott Parson views the family as the site for socialization, a process
whereby parents transmit social values to their children to instill
conformity.37 Failed socialization results in deviance.31 Implicit
within functionalist theory is the deficit model of childhood, which
views childhood both as a transitional phase to becoming an adult
and as a means of ensuring stability through social and cultural
33. See Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Chicken Soup or Chainsaws: Some Implications of the
Constitutionalisation of Children's Rights in South Africa, 1996 ACTA JURIDICA 6, 7.
34. Onora O'Neill, Children's Rights and Children's Lives, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS
AND THE LAw 24,24 (Philip Alston et al. eds., 1993).
35. See, e.g., BENNETT, supra note 12; Boberg, supra note 3; O'Neill supra note 33.
36. TALCOTr PARSONS & ROBERT F. BALES, FAMILY, SOCIALIZATION AND
INTERACTION PROCESS (1955). In Chapter II, Parsons analyzes the relationship
between the structure of the American family and the socialization of the child. Id.
at 35-131.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 144-46.
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reproduction.39 Such an approach rests on weak sociological foundations
because it views children as objects of adult concern and not as self-
conscious social actors.
The critical analytical approach ° is child-centered in that it
studies childhood as a fixed social category, and it locates young
people in society within the variable of class. Children are viewed as
oppressed, disempowered, and marginalized, not allowed to make
decisions affecting their own lives.4' Giving children rights provides
them with institutional means to influence these decisions. Article 12
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the basis for sec-
tion 28 of the Constitution,4 promotes a child-centered approach and
is consistent with the goals of the critical analytical perspective.0 The
Constitution states that children and young persons must be permit-
ted to express their views on matters that affect them.4
Although children are a nonvoting constituency, it is hardly
surprising that a child-centered approach is gaining momentum in
South Africa. One reason is that the youth of South Africa played a
special role in spearheading the struggle for liberation from apart-
heid.0  These contributions to the processes of political
transformation received national recognition through South Africa's
designation of June 16th as Youth Day, the ratification of the UN
39. See Ian Butler, Children and the Sociology of Childhood, in A CASE OF NEGLECT?
CHILDREN'S EXPERIENCES AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD 1, 8 (Ian Butler & Ian
Shaw eds., 1996) ("[In] a deficit model.. .[,] childhood is understood only as a transi-
tional process, en route to becoming an adult.") [hereinafter A CASE OF NEGLECT?];
see also Lesley Pugsley et al., I Don't Eat Peas Anyway! Classroom Stories and the Social
Construction of Childhood, in A CASE OF NEGLECT?, supra, at 56, 56 ("[Clhildhood is
seen as an incremental, staged quest toward.. .adulthood.").
40. The critical approach builds on the achievements of "new criminologists."
See generally I. TAYLOR ET AL., THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF
DEVIANCE (1973), who borrow from the Marxist tradition by including in the sociol-
ogy of youth the variable of class. By applying the category of class to deviant youth,
one views such youths as social actors demonstrating a form of resistance. Id.
41. See Howard Williamson, So Much for 'Participation': Youth Work and Young
People, in A CASE OF NEGLECT?, supra note 39, at 162, 162 ("[Children] are oppressed,
disempowered and excluded from any platform on which the real decisions affecting
their lives are made.").
42. S. AFR. CONST. § 28.
43. See U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 12.
44. S. AFR. CONsT. § 28.
45. South African youth resorted to boycotts of apartheid institutions such as
schools. They also instigated rent and economic boycotts that culminated in violent
confrontations with the police and military. Many of the children from Soweto and
other parts of the country eventually fled into self-imposed exile in the neighboring
countries of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. For a discussion of the role of the
youth in the struggle against apartheid, see KANE-BERMAN, supra note 6, at 47-68;
CHILDREN UNDER APARTHEID, supra note 5, at 95-118.
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the inclusion of section
28 in the Constitution.
A further explanation for the constitutionalization of children's
rights may be the moral legitimacy that the concept of children's
rights enjoys. Commenting on the constitutional negotiation process
that led to the inclusion of a children's rights provision in the Constitu-
tion, Julia Sloth-Nielsen states: "Unlike other fundamental rights, where
compromises between political parties had to be sought, there was no
disagreement about either the desirability or ultimate formulation of the
section on children's rights."4 7 Disagreement does arise, however, in
discussions of the implementation of newly constitutionalized rights.
II. CRITIQUE OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
The unanimous political support for the inclusion of a sepa-
rate provision for children in the Constitution has not translated into
universal support for the specific details of the provision. There have
been discordant voices in legal academic circles" and generally
among the populace.49 The process that yielded the constitutional
protection of children's rights has been criticized, as have the con-
current theoretical debates on the need for and implications of
constitutionalizationso Some commentators argued that the initial
proposals offered weak protections. For example, Du Plessis and
Corder stated that
the Technical Committee's initial proposals for a clause
on children's rights were rather thin. In the Seventh.
Progress Report, for instance, the proposed clause read
as follows: "Every child shall have the right to security,
basic nutrition and basic health services and not to be
subject to neglect, abuse or child labor."
It was during the discussion of this report in the Negoti-
ating Council that a representative of the previous
S[outh] A[frican] Government remarked that "two pages
46. See Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 33, at 6-10.
47. Id. at 8.
48. See Michael King, Against Children's Rights, 1996 ACrA JURIDICA 28
(criticizing the limited ability of children's rights to protect children from anything
but the most severe harms).
49. Richard Stengel, A Land Singing Twin Anthems, TIME, May 8, 1995, at 40 (S.
Afr. ed.).
50. See King, supra note 48; see also LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER,
UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 186 (1994)
(criticizing the limits of children's constitutional right to parental care).
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are devoted to the rights of 'criminals' but only two
lines to the rights of children' ... "
Others have argued that despite the uncontested moral le-
gitimacy enjoyed by the concept of children's rights, the con-
stitutionalization of children's rights is merely safe political rheto-
ric that will not translate into substantive benefits for children. 2 In
this view, the rights rhetoric is not a meaningful way of delivering
social programs for children.0 It is stated that giving children
rights in the Constitution, such as the right not to be maltreated or
abused, will not affect how parents behave towards their children.,4
The inclusion in the Constitution of socio-economic rights in
section 28(1)(c) has attracted criticism. Many believe that second
generation rightss should not be protected in a document that fo-
cuses mainly on first generation rights.-s The difficulty with second
generation rights is said to stem from the fact that the Constitution
includes no mechanisms for their enforcement.5 7 The structure of
.51. DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 50, at 186.
Prompted by these remarks, the Negotiating Council instructed the
Technical Committee to attend to the extension of the clause on chil-
dren's rights. The Technical Committee welcomed this opportunity,
and proceeded to act on a series of submissions from the National
Children's Rights Committee which incorporated principles derived
from international instruments on children's rights[.] The Technical
Committee was in the end satisfied that the clause it proposed ... in-
cluded all the rights of children which can be cited in [such] an
instrument[,J ... with the exception of a reference to a right to a
compulsory minimum education.
Id.
52. See King, supra note 48, at 30-31. See also O'Neill, supra note 34 (arguing that,
to be effective, children's rights must be cast as obligations of the state, not as free-
doms from state coercion).
53. See King, supra note 48, at 48-49.
54. See DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 50, at 186.
55. Second generation rights are economic and social rights; first generation
rights are legal and political rights. BENNETr supra note 13, at 99.
56. See Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 33, at 7.
57. It was said of the interim Constitution that
[o]ne of its major difficulties [was] that it was a preponderantly sec-
ond-generation provision in predominantly first-generation
environment. Neither Chapter 3 nor the transitional Constitution it-
self suggests how second-generation entitlements are to be enforced.
Can a court, for instance, order the State to provide all persons under
the age of 18 years with a basic nutrition and basic health and social
services?
Du PLESSLS & CORDER, supra note 50, at 186.
[VOL. 3:341
Children's Rights
South African democracy belies such claims, as the Constitutional
Court has identified such mechanisms. The socio-economic rights
contained in the Constitution include the rights to basic nutrition,
shelter, basic health care services, and social services" as well as
the right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse, and
degradation." A constitutional command compelling the legislator
to provide free medical care to pregnant women and children does
not necessarily create a subjective right to medical care or basic
nutrition. The lawmaker must first create legislation fulfilling this
right. This raises several questions. What happens if the lawmaker
does not execute such a law or executes it inadequately? Can the
courts offer guidelines as to the way in which the legislator can exe-
cute the directive? In Fraser v. Children's Court,6° the Constitutional
Court did offer such guidelines. It ruled that the legislative command
contained in section 8 of the Constitution establishing equality be-
tween children born in wedlock and extramarital children was
binding and required the lawmaker to comply. 61 Failure to comply
within a period of two years would violate the Constitution.62 The
High Court may also invoke its inherent powers to enforce socio-
economic rights.6
Concern also has been expressed over the implications of con-
stitutionalization for the state. It is argued that giving the children's
rights provision a justiciable character imposes an unrealistic burden
on the State and, consequently, on parents." It is also asserted that
courts are given the power to make decisions concerning the alloca-
tion of fiscal resources to various constituencies, decisions which
some contend belong with elected officials.6 Granting the courts the
power to enforce socio-economic rights does not constitute an inap-
propriate interference in the political process. A court hearing a
constitutional challenge concerning the right to basic nutrition or
basic health care services, will have to determine whether the level
58. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1)(d).
59. Id. § 28(1)(e).
60. 1997 (2) SA 261,273 (CC).
61. Id. at 273.
62. Id. at 282-84.
63. Allen J. Rycroft, The Protection of Socio-Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND
SOCIAL PRACTICE IN SOuTH AFRICA 267, 278-79 (Hugh Corder ed., 1988).
64. See Dennis H. Davis, The Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands
in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles, 8 S. APR. J. HUM. RTS. 486 (1992); Sloth-
Nielsen, supra note 33, at 24-25.
65. DION A. BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITLrION 46 (1994); see also
FIROZ CACHALIA Er AL., FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE NEw CONSTITrION 102 (1994)
(criticizing socio-economic rights for allowing judiciary to allocate economic re-
sources).
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of the services delivered meets the basic needs." If it does not, the
court will find a prima facie infringement of the right and inquire
into whether the violation is justifiable in an open and democratic
society.67 If the infringement cannot be justified, the court will order
the state to comply with its obligations." The Court, however, will
not make decisions of implementation and resource allocation that
should be left to local officials. As Erika de Wet notes:
This does not mean that the court will be interfering
with the allocation of resources. It will not be able to tell
the state how it should relieve the basic needs. It will
only be able to indicate to the state that it is constitu-
tionally bound to ensure the basic needs of children
which must be met before the state begins to allocate
funds for any other projects and expenditure.
69
Many question whether the children's rights provision creates
justiciable rights or merely consists of directive principles. Those
who oppose giving section 28 rights a justiciable character argue that
the concept of a children's rights provision in the Constitution is not
to create justiciable rights but to create directive principles that will
reinforce the unassailability of the concept of human rights.7
At the minimum, constitutionalization legitimates political dis-
course on children's rights and provides political justification for
government expenditure on social programs for children. It also en-
ables the rights claimants, who are children, to make substantial
claims against the State using the law as a sword. It further enables
children to use the law as a shield to protect themselves from erosion
of social benefits by the State. Constitutionalization, however, has
much greater potential. It can create justiciable rights that children
may enforce against the state. The plain language of section 28 of the
Constitution reinforces this notion: "Every child has the right .... "
66. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEABILITY OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS 104-05 (1996). De Wet notes that it is not clear how a court should
determine what is a basic right, but that this determination will be a minimal stan-
dard. Id.
67. See Pierre de Vos, The Economic and Social Rights of Children and South Africa's
Transitional Constitution, 10 S. AFR. PUB. L. 233, 247 (1995) (proposing that govern-
mental failure to regulate housing markets to ensure access by all persons where
there is a constitutional right to housing should "constitute a prima facie infringe-
ment of that right").
68. See DE WET, supra note 66, at 104-05.
69. Id. at 256.
70. See Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 33, at 17 & 17 n.66; Davis, supra note 64, at 486.
71. S. AFR. CONST. § 28 (emphasis added).
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The reference to "right" implies that the drafters meant to create an
enforceable claim.7'
In a democracy, the courts are not the only forums for compel-
ling the State to act in a socially responsible manner. Socio-political
factors, such as the voting power of the poor and the political clout of
both social democrats and child welfare advocates, must be included
in the enforcement equation. The poor constitute the majority of South
Africa's population, and their children are the main beneficiaries of
social welfare programs.7 As a political interest group, the poor are
unique because they have sufficient voting power to compel the gov-
ernment to respect the rights enshrined in section 28 of the Constitution.
Constitutionalization also offers the government political jus-
tification for providing social welfare benefits to children as they
compete for scarce resources with the homeless, the aged, and the
unemployed. In addition to political justification, constitutionaliza-
tion also provides the government with useful moral and legal
justifications for its social welfare expenditures when conservatives
and liberals demand fiscal restraint through reduced expenditures
on social programs.74 The provision of free medical care for children
under six years and pregnant mothers as well as the nutritional
feeding scheme established by the President shortly after the 1994
elections demonstrate substantive outcomes, mainly benefiting the
poor, that are built upon the framework of the constitutional re-
forms.?
H. Do CHILDREN NEED RIGHTS?
Rights skeptics such as King and O'Neill argue that the protection
of children's rights in conventions and constitutions is merely a moral
72. See DE WET, supra note 66, at 104-05; see also Nicholas Haysom, Constitu-
tionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights, 8 S. APR. J. HUM. RTS.
451, 458 (1992); Etienne Mureinik, Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in
the Constitution, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 464, 469-74 (1992); Michael D.A. Freeman,
Taking Children's Rights More Seriously, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND THE LAW, supra
note 32, at 53-54.
73. See Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 32, at 12-14; John Kruger & Shirin Motala,
Welfare, in FIRST CALL: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHILDREN'S BUDGET 65, 107-08 (Shirley
Robinson & Linda Biersteker eds., 1997) (stating poverty rates in South Africa remain
very high and referring to a 1993 study estimating the number of poor people at 18
million or 45.7% of the total population).
74. See generally Michael King, Children's Rights as Communication: Reflections on
Autopoietic Theory and the United Nations Convention, 57 MOD. L. REV. 385 (1994)
(commenting on the symbolism of acknowledging that children have rights).
75. See Sloth-Nielsen, supra note 33, at 12-14; see also Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Ratifica-
tion of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some Implications for
South African Law, 11 S. APR. J. HUM. RTs. 401,401 (1995).
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exhortation and that the granting of rights to children is not a
successful way of eliminating the mistreatment of children.7' King
states that
[i]f we search globally for the causes of the most wide-
spread and most severe suffering to children, we find
not deliberate acts by adults to cause children harm,
but rather such general calamities as war, disease,
poverty, natural disasters, and family breakdown.
Even if we restrict our search to the harmful effects of
government decisions, we hardly ever find that there
was any deliberate intention to damage children.77
King suggests that law be coupled with other social systems,
such as politics and economics, to create a system that would be
more effective in securing the welfare of children. 78 He contends that
this new system could provide economic incentives to companies
not to employ children as well as to allocate greater resources to
children's care and education through families.9
Law, as a closed system, is ineffective in meeting the needs of
children and should be coupled with other systems; however, this
reality does not preclude granting children rights. The constitution-
alization of children's rights provides the basis for operation of the
political and economic incentives and disincentives that King dis-
cusses. ° King's approach to child welfare is parent-centered in that it
treats children as objects of adult concern. King's rights skepticism is
premised on the functionalist approach that views the family in terms
of the public/private dichotomy, a common theme in liberal legal
discourse.81 Public and private spheres of activity are characterized as
separate, with parent/child relations labeled a largely private and
unregulated sphere of family life. 2
76. King, supra note 48, at 39-40; see also O'Neill, supra note 34, at 35-40
(arguing that the rhetoric of rights rarely can empower children).
77. King, supra note 47, at 43-44.
78. Id. at 45-48.
79. Id. at 47-48. King does warn of risks involved in this approach. Putting
pressure on governments and corporations to elicit the desired approach toward
children and their rights can have unpredictable effects, and many attempts to cou-
ple politics and/or economics with the law have not been successful. Id. at 45-48.
80. Id. at 43-48.
81. For a discussion of the public/private dichotomy and its implications for
parent/child relations, see Andrew Bainham, The Privatisation of the Public Interest in
Children, 53 MOD. L. REv. 206, 206-09 (1990); see also DIANA GrrrINS, THE FAMILY IN
QUESTION (1985) (challenging the family ideology to create equality among men,
women, and children).
82. Bainham, supra note 81, at 206; KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN
LAW 2-20 (1985).
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The functionalist position is inaccurate, largely because child
rearing is a public function. Consequently, parent/child relations
should not be viewed as operating outside the public sphere of
activity.' 3 The failure to regulate parent-child relations by giving
children rights would reinforce existing inequalities in parent-child
relations and idealize the family as a safe haven for children.8 In
South Africa, child abuse, both within and outside the family struc-
ture, is commonplace. Child sexual and physical abuse is on the
increase. ' Under apartheid, the government denied Black children
most educational oportunities." Their labor was exploited by farm-
ers and merchants. In addition, because Black children participated
in the armed struggle against apartheid, they were the victims of
police and military brutality.m To curb these abuses and the resulting
detrimental effects, the new South African Government had to grant
children several rights. Children cannot be involved in armed con-
flict.89 They can be detained only as a measure of last resort.90
Children are entitled to legal representation.1 They should be pro-. ° • 92
tected from exploitative labor practices. They have a right to a
name and nationality. 93 Children also are entitled to protection from
maltreatment, neglect, abuse, or degradation." In the following pages,
this Paper will examine the ways in which these rights are recognized
and enforced. The background to their inclusion in South African
constitutional and statutory law will be studied as will remaining
83. John Eekelaar, What Is "Critical" Family Law?, 105 LQ. REV. 244, 254-58
(1989).
84. See Christopher Lasch, The Family as a Haven in a Heartless World, in FAMILY IN
TRANSmON 80 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 1980).
85. CARMEL MATrHIAS, REMOVAL OF CHILDREN AND THE RIGHT TO FAMILY LIFE:
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND PRACICE 24 (1997) (stating that "[ifn 1995, 28,482 cases of
crime against children were reported." This represented an increase of 20.4% over the
previous year's figure, which had risen by 37.6% since 1993.).
86. Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, The Role of Local Government in the Democratisation of
Sporting, Cultural, Educational and Recreational Opportunities, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 55, 61 (Shadrack Bo Gutto ed., 1996); see
also SEAN JONES, ASSAULTING CHILDHOOD : CHILDREN'S EXPERIENCES OF MIGRANCY
AND HOSTEL LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA 163-206 (1993); CHILDREN UNDER APARTHEID,
supra note 6, at 35-43.
87. CHILDREN UNDER APARTHEID, supra note 6, at 45-54.
88. Charlene Smith & Fred Khumalo, "Suffer The Children": Refugees & Disrupted
Schooling in Natal, in PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE: CASE STUDIES OF CONFLICT IN NATAL
259 (Anthony Minaar ed., 1992).
89. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1)(i).
90. Id. § 28(1)(g).
91. Id. § 28(1)(h).
92. Id. § 28(1)(e).
93. Id. § 28(1)(a).
94. Id. § 28(1)(d).
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obstacles to their enjoyment by the children of South Africa. This
examination will reveal the logic of South Africa's child-centered
approach and the implications of this approach for parent-child rela-
tions in South Africa.
A. The Child's Right Not to Be Used in Armed Conflict and to Be Protected
in Times of Armed Conflict
During the 1976 uprisings, a large number of Black children
were involved in the armed struggle against apartheid and died as a
result of conflicts with the military and the police.95 Their experi-
ences contrast with the assertion of King and others that most of the
harms suffered by children are not the result of deliberate govern-
mental acts.9 If, as King suggests, children do not suffer at the hands
of the government, it is easier to refute child-centered policies by
suggesting that protection should not come directly from the gov-
ernment. Section 28(1)(i)9 of the Constitution protects children
against abuses similar to those suffered under apartheid.
There is a developed body of international law concerning the
role of children in armed conflict. It is a problem that is not unique
to South Africa. During the Iran-Iraq war, children were involved in
armed conflict and were considered a powerful fighting force be-
cause of their lack of fear.98 Article 77(2) of Protocol Number 1 to the
Geneva Convention Number 4 provides that children should not
take a "direct part in hostilities."9 Protocol Number 2 contains a
broader prohibition, forbidding the direct or indirect participation of
children under fifteen years of age in hostilities.W Article 38(2) of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child places an obligation on state
parties to ensure that children under fifteen do not participate directly
95. Smith & Khumalo, supra note 88, at 259-64.
96. King, supra note 48, at 43-44.
97. Section 28(1)(i) provides that children have the right "not to be used directly
in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict." S. AFR. CONST.
§ 28(1)(i).
98. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD 336 (1995).
99. International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 847 (1987)
[hereinafter ICRC]. The International Committee of the Red Cross unsuccessfully
opposed the inclusion of the word "direct" as it would appear to condone indirect
participation such as transporting munitions to the battlefront, which is as dangerous
as direct combat. VAN BUEREN, supra note 98, at 334.
100. ICRC, supra note 99, at 1367. Van Bueren describes the duty on states found
in protocol no. 2 as being "absolute" VAN BuEREN, supra note 98, at 334.
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in hostilities. °' The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
child prohibits anyone under eighteen from participating directly in
hostilities.1°2 Islamic law may prohibit the participation in jihad of
those under fifteen.'3
The experiences of South African Black youth during the 1976
uprisings and throughout the violent political struggle against
apartheid illustrate the importance of extending the prohibition on
the involvement of children under a certain age to indirect participa-
tion and internal conflicts. A large number of Black children died in
internal conflicts with the military and the police. Chikane describes
the structural origins of violence and its psychological and norma-
tive effects on Black children in the following terms:
[Conditions in the townships] have affected children more
than many people realize. The world of the township child
is extremely violent. It is a world made up of tear gas, bul-
lets, whippings, detention, and death on the streets. It is an
experience of military operations and night raids, of road-
blocks and body searches. It is a world where parents and
friends get carried away in the night to be interrogated. It
is a world where people simply disappear, where parents
are assassinated and homes are petrol bombed. Such is the
environment of the township child today."°
The international limit for participation in armed conflict is,
effectively, fifteen years. In terms of sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the
Defence Act,05 the minimum age for cadet training and in the South
African Defense Force is twelve and the minimum recruitment age
for military service is seventeen.'O° Section 37(5) of the Constitution,
which sets out the table of non-derogable rights, is child-centered in
that it creates a non-derogable right for children under fifteen to
avoid military service and it is consistent with the international
standard for military service.
101. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 38(2). The Convention provides that "States
Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not attained
the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities." Id. art. 38.
102. Id. at 335.
103. Id. at 334.
104. As quoted in Jones, supra note 86, at 143.
105. § 3(a) & (b) of Defence Act 44 of 1957.
106. Id.
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B. The Rights of Children in Police Detention/Custody
During the struggle for liberation in South Africa, the State
violently oppressed many Black children who were responsible for
spearheading the resistance against apartheid. Children were detained
arbitrarily under conditions that were in violation of most relevant
international instruments: article 37(c)' ° and article 40(1)1.8 of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child,1' the United Nations Guide-
lines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency,'" the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Jus-
tice,"' and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of Their Liberty."1
2
107. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 37(c). Article 37(c) provides that "every
child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the
child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his
or her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances."
Id.
108. Id. art. 40(1). Article 40(1) states that
States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of,
or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a
manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity
and worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account
the child's age and the desirability of promoting the child's reinte-
gration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society.
Id.
109. See Evadne Grant, Protective Custody of Juvenile Witnesses, 5 S. AFR. J. HUM.
RTS. 221, 226-27 (1989) (referring to principles 2, 6, and 7 of the U.N. Declaration on
the Rights of the Child); See also Falk, supra note 7, at 19 (arguing that South African
forces have violated provisions relating inter alia to custody of child offenders).
110. G.A. Res. 112, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/112 (1991) (Riyadh Guidelines). The guidelines require governments to
prevent children from being victimized or abused, id. 53, and from being subjected
to harsh or degrading punishment. Id. 1 54. Similarly, states must train law enforce-
ment officials to respond to children's special needs and divert children from the
criminal justice system. Id. 1 58.
111. UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (Beijing Rules), U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/33
(1985). These standards require the state to impose criminal penalties on juvenile
offenders in a racially non-discriminatory manner. Id. § 2.1. Under the Standards, a
government's juvenile justice system must also emphasize the well-being of the
juvenile, id. § 5.1, and provide basic procedural safeguards including presumption of
innocence, right to counsel, and right to the presence of a parent or guardian. Id.
§§ 7.1, 15.1, 15.2. The Minimum Rules also call for parental notification upon appre-
hension, id. § 10.1, diversion from the criminal justice system wherever possible, id.
§§ 11.1-11.4, a speedy trial on charges, id. § 20.1, and use of detention pending trial
and incarceration as punishment only as a last resort. Id. §§ 13.1, 17.1, 19.1.
112. G.A. Res. 113, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/113 (1991) (JDLs). In addition to the protections called for in the previ-
Children's Rights
One of the aims of the Constitution and post-Constitution statutes
was to bring South Africa into compliance with the above mentioned
international instruments. Section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution was en-
acted to protect the rights of children in police detention or
custody."' Section 50(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act"' creates an
obligation for investigating officers to notify the parent or guardian
of the arrest of a person under eighteen years, if such parent or
guardian can be reached without undue delay."' Section 29 of the
Correctional Services Act' 6 was amended by the Correctional Serv-
ices Amendment Act" 7 to bring the juvenile justice system in
conformity with the child-centered approach adopted in the above
mentioned international instruments.
Section 29(1) of the Correctional Services Act,"8 as amended
in 1994, proscribed detention in prison or a police cell or lock up of
a person under eighteen years accused of committing an offense, un-
less his detention was necessary and no suitable place of safety was
available."9 Section 29(2) of the Correctional Services Amendment Act
made it possible for young offenders to be detained only in police
cells or lock-ups, and not in a prison, for up to twenty-four hours
prior to the first court appearance.'2" This detention would only be
permissible if the young offender could not be released into the care
ously cited resolutions, the JDLs require that juvenile detention and incarceration
facilities meet requirements of health and human dignity including, proper food and
medical care. Id. J J 31, 31, 37, 49. The JDLs also require notification of parents or
guardians in the event of changes in the juvenile's health status, id. T 56, and limita-
tions on the use of force during confinement. Id. J 64.
113. Section 28(1)(g) stipulates that every child has the right
not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in
addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the
child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of
time, and has the right to be -
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18
years; and
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account
of the child's age.
S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1)(g).
114. § 50(4) of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, amended by § 37 of Correctional
Services and Supervision Matters Amendment Act 122 of 1991.
115. Id.
116. Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959.
117. Correctional Services Amendment Act 17 of 1994.
118. § 29(1) of Correctional Services Act of 1959.
119. Julia Sloth-Nielsen, No Child Should be Caged-Closing Doors on the Detention of
Children, 8 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JusT. 47, 52 (1995).
120. Id.
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of a parent or guardian."' Section 29(3) of the Correctional Services
Amendment Act prohibits the detention of young offenders under
eighteen years of age in the same cells as persons over twenty-one
122years.
Practical problems impeded the implementation of the child-
centered vision embodied in section 29 of the Correctional Services
Amendment Act. When section 29 took effect at midnight on May
8, 1995, most of those who would be called on to implement the
Act were still unaware of the reform.12 In addition, there were few
available places of safety. 24 Courts, unable to remand children to
custody, were forced to release them on their own recognizance or
in the care of a parent or guardian on the understanding that they
would reappear for trial.' Many of the children did not return to
court on their trial dates.'22 Imprecise drafting also hindered the
implementation of child-centered goals of section 29. Section 29
prohibits the detention of unconvicted juveniles in police cells or
prisons, but does not address the issue of convicted juveniles
awaiting sentencing. As a result, children were likely to pend
prolonged periods in detention while awaiting sentencing.' Per-
haps the most troubling dilemma involved juveniles charged with
the commission of serious offenses, as places of safety were not
thought to be equipped to hold potentially violent inmates.
The implementation of section 29 also met with widespread
public resistance because many perceived the criminal justice system
to be soft on escalating violent youth crime. In response to this pub-
lic outcry, the amendments to section 2928 that prohibited the
detention of unconvicted juveniles in prisons or police cells were
replaced by Act 14 of 1996.12 The rights originally given to children
in this child-centered statute were severely scaled back."3"
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Juvenile Justice Review 1994-1995, 8 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST.
331, 332 (1995).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 333.
128. The amendments were introduced by Correctional Services Amendment Act
17 of 1994.
129. Correctional Services Amendment Act 14 of 1996. For a detailed discussion
of the background and process of amendment, see generally Julia Sloth-Nielsen,
Pre-Trial Detention of Children Revisited: Amending s 29 of the Correctional Services Act, 9
S. AFR. J. CRIM. JusT. 60 (1996).
130. Section 29(5)(A) of Correctional Services Amendment Act 14 of 1996 substi-
tuted section 29(5) of Correctional Services Amendment Act 17 of 1994 by stating:
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In State v. Williams,"' the Constitutional Court contributed to
the effort to bring juvenile penal laws into accord with international
jurisprudence by declaring judicial corporal punishment to be un-
constitutional on the grounds that it is cruel, inhuman, and
degrading.'32 By doing so, the Court reinforced the child-centered
ideals set out in the Constitution. Following the Constitutional Court
decision in Williams, Parliament sought to entrench these child-
centered ideals by proposing the Abolition of Corporal Punishment
[a] person referred to in subsection (1)(B) who is accused of having
committed an offence shall before his or her conviction and sentence,
not be detained in a prison or a police cell or lock-up unless the pre-
siding officer has reason to believe that his or her detention is
necessary in the interests of the administration of justice and the
safety and protection of the public and no secure place of safety,
within a reasonable distance from the court, mentioned in section 28
of the Child Care Act, 1983 (Act No. 74 of 1983), is available for his or
her detention: Provided that such a person may only be detained in a
prison (but not a police cell or lock-up) if he or she is accused of
having committed an offence or category of offences mentioned in
Schedule 2, or any other offence, in circumstances of such a serious
nature as to warrant such detention: Provided further that such a
person shall be brought before the court that made the order of such
detention every 14 days to enable such court to reconsider the said
order.
Id. § 29(5)(A). Sections 29(5A)(A) and (B) were inserted by Act 14 of 1996:
(A) In considering whether the interests of the administration of jus-
tice and the safety and protection of the public necessitate the
detention of a person referred to in subsection (1)(B) in a prison (but
not a police cel or lock-up) the presiding officer shall, in addition to
any factor which he or she deems necessary, take into account the
following factors, namely-
(i) the substantial risk of absconding from a place of safety men-
tioned in section 28 of the Child Care Act, 1983 (Act No. 74 of 1983);
(ii) the substantial risk of causing harm to other persons awaiting
trial in a place of safety; and
(iii) the disposition of the accused to commit offences.
(B) Before the detention of a person in terms of subsection (5) is or-
dered, oral evidence shall be presented by the State with regard to the
factors referred to in paragraph (A).
Id. § 29(5A)(A) & B.
Section 29(8) of the Correctional Services Amendment Act, which was also in-
serted by Act 14 of 1996 provides that "[flor the purpose of this section, an
unconvicted person shall be construed as a person who has not been convicted or
sentenced." Id. § 29(8)
131. State v. Williams, 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC).
132. Id. at 658.
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Bill,1n the aim of which is to repeal all laws that still provide for judi-
cial corporalpunishment. On November 6, 1996, the South African
Schools Act,' which contains a prohibition of corporal punishment in
schools, was enacted. Nonetheless, there is opposition to making cor-
poral punishment unconstitutional from those like David Benatar
who suggest that judicial corporal punishment may not necessarily be
cruel or unjust or excessively degrading.'m Corporal punishment in
the home and in schools continues to be practiced. As with the
struggle over confinement, this debate over corporal punishment
demonstrates some of the practical obstacles to full implementation
of the Constitution's child-centered approach. While not to be disre-
garded, such obstacles may be overcome by structural changes and
educational programs.
C. The Child's Right to Legal Representation
Employing a child-centered approach, section 28(1)(h) of the
Constitution protects a child's right to legal representation.' 36 The
1996 amendments to section 8 of the Child Care Act were meant to• .* 137
implement this innovation. Under subsection 8A(1) of the
amended Act, a child is entitled to legal representation at any stage
of the proceedings under the Act." Subsection 8A(2) of the
amended Act requires a children's court to inform children, at the
commencement of any proceedings, that they have the right to re-
quest legal representation at any stage of the proceedings 9
133. Abolition of Corporal Punishment Bill 20 of 1997.
134. South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. Section 10 of that Act provides that "no
person may administer corporal punishment at a school to a learner[,and][a]ny
person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and liable on convic-
tion to a sentence which could be imposed for assault." Id. § 10.
135. David Benatar, The Child, the Rod and the Law, 1996 ACTAJURIDICA 197.
136. Section 28(1)(h) provides that every child has the right "to have a legal prac-
titioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil proceedings
affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result." S. AFR. CoNsT.
§ 28(1)(h).
This section furthers the objectives of section 37(d) of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which states that state parties shall ensure that
[e]very Child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to
prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as
the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her lib-
erty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial
authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action.
U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 37(d).
137. § 2 of Child Care Amendment Act 96 of 1996.
138. § 8A(1) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
139. § 8A(2) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
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This statute does not realize fully the Constitutional guarantee
of legal representation for children. First, the child's right to counsel
appears to be limited to child care proceedings because the court is
not obliged to extend the right to legal representation to the child in
cases that do not come under the Child Care Act.'" Second, the pro-
vision fails to address adequately the practical problems that may
arise during implementation. For example, a child may be incapable
of understanding or instructing counsel. The Statute does not define
clearly what the responsibility of the Children's Court is when a
child makes a frivolous re Vuest for legal representation. The court
could deny such a request;' likewise, the court could insist that the
child's best interests require legal representation despite a refusal.
One reading of section 8A(4)'4 of the amended Act suggests that
there is no such obligation on the children's court in such situa-
tions. Third, it is clear that, in operation, the child's legal
representation is discretionary on the part of Commissioners of
Child Welfare.'4 Finally, this provision may undermine the child's
autonomy and create potential conflict of interests, particularly
"where parents (who may be akin to defendants in a removal en-
quiry) are empowered to appoint a legal representative for the
child."'"
The 1996 amendments to the Child Care Act have been hailed
as a welcome innovation because Child Welfare Commissioners are
empowered to arrange child legal representation in appropriate
cases. It is important to note, however, that the amendments may
not result in increased child representation in the Children's Court,
due to the emphasis on cost and the fact that the child's right to legal
representation is essentially at the discretion of the Child Welfare
140. Both child removal and adoption cases, in which parties generally seek legal
representation, come under the Act. Noel Zaal, When Should Children Be Legally
Represented in Care Proceedings? An Application of Section 28(l)(h) of the 1996 Constitu-
tion, 114 S. AFR. L.J. 335, 341 (1997); see also Julia Sloth-Nielsen & Belinda Van
Heerden, The Child Care Amendment Act 1996: Does It Improve Children's Rights in
South Africa?, 12 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 649, 650 (1996) (describing limits of guidance in
application of amended provisions).
141. See Zaal, supra note 140, at 336; see also Sloth-Nielsen & Van Heerden, supra
note 140, at 650.
142. § 8A(4) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983. The section states that "[a] children's
court may, at the commencement of a proceeding or at any stage of the proceeding,
order that legal representation be provided for a child at the expense of the state,
should the children's court consider it to be in the best interest of such child." Id.
143. See Zaal, supra note 140, at 335-36; see also Sloth-Nielsen & Van Heerden,
supra note 140, at 650. Subsection 8A(3) is worthy of note in that it empowers the
children's court to approve "that a parent may appoint a legal practitioner for his or
her child for any proceeding under this Act, should the children's court consider it to
be in the best interest of such child." Id. § 8A(3).
144. Sloth-Nielsen & Van Heerden, supra note 140, at 650.
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Commissioners." The amendments clearly do not render completely
operational the child-centered norm expressed in section 28(1)(h).
D. The Right to Be Protected from Exploitative Labor Practices
1. The Problem of Child Labor
Child labor is fairly common in poor countries, and South Africa
is no exception. South Africa has been systematically underdeveloped
by successive apartheid polides.'4 A majority of the population still
lives in abject poverty.' In South Africa, largely among the under-
classes where children are considered to be an economic resource,
there are strong economic constraints against eliminating child labor,
powerful vested interests in maintaining the current state of affairs,
and widespread cultural and legal support for the use of children's
work.4 8 South African indigenous law and common law both recog-
nize a child's duty to provide support for indigent parents.
Though fairly common, child labor remains hidden from public
view. It tends to be intermittent and to take place in the informal
sector (including domestic work and family business enterprises)."
145. Zaal, supira note 140, at 334-36; Sloth-Nielsen & Van Heerden, supra note 140,
at 650.
146 A. Bequele, Combating Child Labor, 10 CONDITIONS WORK DIG. 7, 8 (1991).
147. Lorraine Eide, Current Crisis Facing Children in South Africa and the Efforts to
Overcome It, 34 HOWARD L.J. 37, 38 (1991).
148. Jo Boyden & Victoria Rialp, Children's Right to Protection From Economic
Exploitation, in IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD:
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION IN Low-INCOME COUNTRIES 183 (James R. Himes ed., 1995).
149. See, e.g., BOBERG, supra note 4, at 267-70, 273 n.81. The South African courts
tend to interpret the indigence requirement strictly. Id. at 310-12. Boberg suggests
that a less strict interpretation be placed upon the requirement of indigence when it
is necessary to found a dependant's action against a third party. A stricter interpre-
tation should be applied where the duty of support is necessary to found a claim for
maintenance by a parent against a child because neither has wronged the other and
the court must strike a balance between the needs of the parties and their respective
resources. Id.
150. In a discussion of the implementation of international labor standards, H. T.
Dao states that the national provisions frequently fall short of international standards
because they do not reach into the sectors where children are actually working. H.T.
Dao, International Labour Standards and Their Implementations, 10 CONDITIONS WORK
DIG. 57, 68 (1991).
In one case concerning Convention No. 138, the minimum age provi-
sions only cover industrial undertakings.... In one case related to
Convention No. 138, family undertakings are exempted from the
legal provisions on minimum age .... In a case relating to the applica-
tion of Convention No. 77, it has been found that undertakings
employing less than 20 workers are not covered in one country .... In-
dustrial homeworkers and persons in domestic service are
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2. Legislative Interventions
The final Constitution, together with national legislation, set
minimum standards for child labor. Many South African children
are employed at low wages with no benefits and are expected to
perform various harmful tasks. 5' Subsections 28(1)(e) and (f) of the
Constitution, 2 which address the problem of child labor and the eco-
nomic exploitation of children, incorporate the child-centered ideals of
article 23 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. Children are
provided with constitutional protection against exploitative and unfair
labor practices that require children to perform work or provide serv-
ices that are age inappropriate or that place their well-being;
education; physical or mental health; or their spiritual, moral, or
social development at risk.'u
exempted from the relevant provisions in two cases concerning
respectively Convention No. 138 (minimum age) and Convention
No. 78 (medical examination in non-industrial occupations) ....
Relevant national provisions are frequently not applicable to persons
who work outside an employment relationship in cases related to
Convention No. 138 on minimum age (seven cases) and Convention
No. 58 on minimum age for employment at sea (one case).
id.
151. BOSMAN-SWANEPOEL & WESSELS, supra note 18, at 82.
152. S. AFR. CoNsT. § 28(1)(e), (f).
153. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 32. Article 23 reads:
(1) States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from
economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to
be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be
harmful to the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or
social development.
(2) States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and edu-
cational measures to ensure that implementation of the present
article. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of
other international instruments, States Parties shall in particular:
(a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to
employment;
(b) Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions
of employment;
(c) Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure
the effective enforcement of the present article.
154. S. AFR. CONsT. § 28(1)(e), (f). The Constitution recognizes that each child has
the right to be "protected from exploitative labor practices; [each child also has the
right] not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that ...
are inappropriate for a person of that child's age ... or place at risk the child's well-
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The terms of subsections 28(1)(e) and (f) are enforced through
various pieces of national legislation,'s including Chapter 6 of the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act."'6Chapter 6 prohibits the em-
ployment of children of school-going age (under fifteen).'5 Section
49 of the same bill prohibits all forced labor."' Section 52A of the
Child Care Act prohibits the employment of children under fifteen.159
Section 111 of the Merchant Shipping Act prohibits the employment
of a person under eighteen as a trimmer or fireman on a ship. 60 Sec-
tion 12 of the Security Officers Act prohibits the employment of
persons under eighteen as security officers.1 61 Section 32(1) of the
Minerals Act prohibits the employment of children under sixteen
underground in any mine." 2
At least for the present in South Africa, child labor is a fact of
life that many accept. A blanket prohibition simply does not reflect
reality. The Minister may, by publishing a notice, prevent any em-
ployment from being prohibited.163 Employment of children in the
advertising industry is exempted.'" Once again, child-centered norms
are forced to conform to reflect the reality of law and society in South
Africa.
3. The Limits of Legislative Interventions
Legislative intervention provides a limited and ineffective re-
sponse to a hidden and pervasive problem such as child labor. Labor
laws are designed essentially to regulate the formal sector, where
both strict regulation and monitoring are feasible. However, because
most children are employed in the informal sector, labor laws can
only be one part of an effective response to 'this problem.
being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or social develop-
ment." Id.
155. The provisions of subsections 28(1)(e) and (f) of the Constitution must be
read in conjunction with section 23(1), which provides that "[e]veryone has the right
to fair labor practices." S. AFR. CONST. § 23(1). Section 13 protects everyone, including
children, against slavery, servitude, or forced labor. Id. § 13.
156. §§ 43-48 Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1998
157. Id.
158. Id. § 49.
159. § 52A of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
160. § 111 of Merchant Shipping Act 57 of 1951.
161. § 12 of Security Officers Act 92 of 1987.
162. § 32(1) of Minerals Act 50 of 1991.
163. Angelo Pantazis, Children's Rights, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH
AFRICA 33-10 (Chaskalson et al. eds., 1996).
164. § 17 of Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983; Pantazis, supra note
163, at 33-10.
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The task of eliminating child labor is complicated by the
widespread cultural support for child labor and public indifference
to the problem. Constitutional and legislative interventions that
prohibit child labor are criticized as providing a Western response to
an African problem.'" It is argued that the protection of children
from economic exploitation by international law is dictated by West-
ern legal concepts and that subsections 28(1)(e) and (f) of the
Constitution, in protecting children from exploitative labor practices,
incorporate the language of international law.'" It is also argued that
subsections 28(1)(e) and (f) reflect the individualist values of an in-
dustrialized society and that they conflict with the more communal
African tradition.' It is further argued that the Constitution under-
mines family autonomy in that it gives children rights without
stating their obligations to their families.' It is also contended that
the fiscal and economic challenges facing an underdeveloped econ-
omy such as South Africa's are not taken into account.' 69 In a country
165. See BENNETT, supra note 13, at 98 (asserting that the children's rights
movement has embraced Western norms). It is clear that the fight against child labor
originated in Western industrialized nations and that it has evolved there as well.
Boyden & Rialp, supra note 148, at 187-88.
166. Bennett identifies two significant international norms in section 30 of the
interim Constitution. "A 'child' is deemed to be a person under the age of 18
years[,] ... and in all matters concerning children their best interests are the para-
mount consideration." BENNETT, supra note 13, at 100.
167. Bennett looks at a number of the conflicts that arise between communal
African tradition and the individualist values enshrined in the Constitution in a
section entitled, "Implication of Fundamental Rights for Customary Law." Id. at 101-
12.
168. Bennett notes that although children are granted rights upon which parents
cannot infringe, parents are still responsible for raising and caring for children. Id.
Du Plessis and Corder point out that "the right to parental care is a constitutional
right of the child. Nowhere in chapter 3 is any parental right (or a right to family life)
proclaimed." Du PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 50, at 186.
169. Davis, supra note 64, at 479. Eliminating child labor in South Africa will be
costly. See Boyden & Rialp, supra note 148, at 210-19.
The way in which children are reared in South Africa is all too often
dictated by poverty. A prevalent and unhappy reality, poverty has
the unfortunate effect of distorting the application of constitutional
rights. Children from affluent backgrounds can expect to undergo a
lengthy period of education before moving out into the world. In
contrast, poorer children must, for the sake of survival, begin work at
the earliest possible age. What constitutes neglect of a child in a
wealthy family, therefore, would almost certainly not be neglect in a
family subsisting on the poverty datum line.. The Constitution has no
provisions, however, that would permit such economic cleavages to in-
fluence the interpretation/limitation of fundamental rights. [Section 36]
allows limitation only by laws of general application ....
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with so much poverty, is it reasonable to expect children not to
work?
Contrary to popular perceptions, child labor is not economically
efficient. Children tend to be employed in the informal sector at low
wages and under exploitative conditions.'7° Their work tends to be
marginal, intermittent, and casual. Children tend to consume more
than they earn. To combat child labor successfully, the government, as
King suggests, must couple law with politics and economics by form-
ing alliances with non-governmental, voluntary, and grassroots
organizations.' 1 It also will have to provide assistance to families so as
to reduce their reliance on child labor. The constitutional protection
and subsequent legislation are not enough to end a well-established
practice that, to some extent, has been protected by the parent-
centered legal structure of South Africa. The subject of child labor law
presents another illustration of the difficulties involved in imposing
child-centered norms on South Africa.
E. The Right to a Name and Nationality from Birth
The Constitution Tprotects a child's "right ... to a name and
nationality from birth."' The child's right to a name and nationality,
and the right to have his or her name and other basic family infor-
mation registered, comprise a child's right to a legal identity. The
child's right to a legal identity also should be viewed as an extension
of the child's right to human dignity, which is articulated in section
10 of the Constitution and is a non-derogable right."" Every child has
a right to know of his or her origins. The right to an identity has
important psychological and emotional content because a name
connects a child to his or her family.
1. Name
The right to a name contained in section 28(1)(a) of the Constitu-
tion incorporates some basic principles from articles 7(1)' 7' and
BENNEIr, supra note 13, at 101 (citations omitted); see also WrLLEM SCHURINK ET AL.,
CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPLORING SOME DIMENSIONS OF CHILD LABOUR IN
SouTH AFRICA (1997).
170. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 98, at 263-64.
171. King, supra note 48, at 45-48; see also Boyden & Rialp, supra note 148, at 184
(asserting that the government's challenge is to create and sustain coalitions against
child labor).
172. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1)(a).
173. Id. § 10.
174. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 7(1). Article 7(1) of the Convention pro-
vides that "[t]he child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
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8(1) ' of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. While these
principles also are spelled out in the Births and Deaths Registrations
Act of 1992,76 this Act also reinforces patriarchal ideology. For example,
section 9(2) provides that, where the child is born in wedlock, registra-
tion will be "under the surname of the father of the child concemed."'1
Section 10(1), dealing with the registration of a child born out of wed-
lock, provides that "[nlotice of birth of a child born out of wedlock shall
be given... under the surname of the mother."'7  These provisions dis-
criminate unfairly against those born out of wedlock by denying them
ties with their fathers7 and conflict with the gender equality provision
contained in section 9(3) of the Constitution."'
The constitutional right to have a name at birth has important
implications for adopted children's searches for their parents' identi-
ties. This situation is especially true for adopted children whose
racial and cultural identity differs from that of their adoptive par-
ents.8  Section 25 of the Child Care Act permits an adopted child's
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible,
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents." Id.
175. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 8(1). Article 8(1) of the Convention provides
that "States parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law
without unlawful interference." Id.
176. Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992. Section 9(6) of the Act pro-
vides that "[n]o person's birth shall be registered unless a forename and a surname
have been assigned to him." Id. § 9(6).
177. Id. § 9(2).
178. Id. § 10(1).
179. Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, Is Papa a Rolling Stone? The Unwed Father and His
Child in South African Law--a Comment on Fraser v. Naude, 29 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S.
AFR. 152, 154 (1996); see also Kenneth Hughes, Law, Religion, and Bastardy: Compara-
tive and Historical Perspectives, in QUESTIONABLE ISSUE: ILLEGITIMACY IN SOUTH
AFRICA 1, 2-4 (Sandra Burman & Eleanor Preston-Whyte eds., 1992) (describing
social and legal impacts of such discrimination).
180. S. AFR. CONST. § 9(3). In Fraser v. Children's Court, 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC), the
court decided that section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act, which denied unwed fa-
thers the right to consent to the adoption of their children, was unconstitutional to
the extent that it discriminated unfairly between wed and unwed fathers. Though the
Fraser decision is cast in terms of parental rights, it implies that similar discrimina-
tion between legitimate and illegitimate children violates the Constitution's equality
provision. For a comment on the Fraser decision, see Mosikatsana, supra note 179, at
164.
181. Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, Examining Class and Racial Bias in the Adoptions Proc-
ess and the Viability of Transracial Adoptions as a Policy Preference: A Further Reply to
Professors Joubert, Pakati and Zaal, 4 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. (forthcoming 1997); see also
Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, Transracial Adoptions: Are We Learning the Right Lessons from
the Americans and Canadians?-A Reply to Professors Joubert and Zaal, 112 S. AFR. L.J.
606, 613-16 (1995) (arguing that transracial adoptees may suffer identity crises from
loss of racial or cultural identity). But cf. Noel Zaal, Avoiding the Best Interests of the
Child, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 372 (1994) (arguing that considerations of cultural
identity should be secondary to placing a child in the best available home). See also
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surname at birth to be changed to that of the adoptive parent or
parents. ' a Unless special provision is made under national legisla-
tion for accessing the birth records of adoptees, section 25 can
operate to undermine the rights of adoptees to know of their legal
identity at birth. Some commentators argue that adopted children
who are denied information about their birth parents are being de-
nied peace of mind and mental health.'8
The Child Care Act makes information regarding an adopted
child's identity at birth more readily available than it has been under
previous legislation. The child's constitutional right to a name at
birth should be interpreted to prevent adoptees' rights to their birth
records from being subject to ministerial discretion. Constitutionali-
zation of this issue would help mitigate health consequences to the
adopted child and maintain the protection afforded birth parents by
the current discretionary system because the adoptees' rights must
be limited by the birth parents' rights to privacy, contained in sec-
tion 14 of the Constitution.'"
D.J. Joubert, Interracial Adoptions: Can We Learn from the Americans?, 110 S. AFR. L.J.
726 (1993) (acknowledging that cultural differences in transracial adoptions should
be considered but should not be conclusory).
182. § 25 of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
183. Ingrid Baer, Adoptees Searching for their Origins, in PARENTHOOD IN MODERN
SOCIETY 241, 243 n.5, 244 n.6 (John Eekelaar & Peter Sarcevic eds., 1993) (discussing
the importance to adoptees of learning about their origins); see also Jonathan Klaaren,
Access to Information, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 24-1 (Matthew
Chaskalson et al. eds., 1996) (arguing generally that people should have a right of
access to information except in very few circumstances).
The strongest argument, although not the only argument, for the right of the
child to
access to genetic history is that such access minimi[z]es genealogical
bewilderment, as the process of identification with others can be in-
corporated into the self-image. Genealogical bewilderment may
occur where children either do not have any knowledge of their bio-
logical parents or possess only uncertain knowledge... [t]he
resulting state of confusion and uncertainty 'fundamentally under-
mines' children's sense of security, thus affecting their mental
health... [w]ithout knowing about one's origins and genealogy it is
difficult if not impossible to understand one's characteristics and
potential. In the case of adopted children, this extends to two sets of
genealogies. By denying access there would appear to be an implied
challengeable assumption that adopted children have less need than
others to know their genealogical make-up.
Geraldine Van Bueren, Children's Access to Adoption Records-State Discretion or an
Enforceable International Right?, 58 MOD. L. REv. 37,42 (1995).
184. S. AFR. CONST. § 14. See David McQuoid-Mason, Privacy, in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 183, at 18-1, 18-7 (arguing that privacy rights
permit individuals to make important life decisions without state interference); see
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2. Nationality
The protection of the child's right to nationality has a special
significance for South Africa. The apartheid State denied Black chil-
dren a common citizenship with Whites and relegated them to
second class citizenship through racist, non-child-centered legisla-
tion.'5 The forced removal and homeland policies assigned Black
children to a homeland on the basis of their ethnic and tribal origin.
The political rationale for the homeland policy was to deny Blacks
citizenship rights in the country of their birth. Articles 7 and 8 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child obligates South Africa to
provide a common citizenship for all and to eradicate past discrimi-
natory practices.'"
Section 3(1) of the Constitution incorporates the provisions of
articles 7 and 8 of the UN Convention by providing for a common
citizenship for all South Africans. 87 Section 3(2) provides that all
South African citizens are "equally entitled to the rights, privileges,
and benefits of citizenship; and equally subject to the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship."'m Section 3(3) of the Constitution
states that "[niational legislation must provide for the acquisition,
loss and restoration of citizenship."'8 9 The South African Citizenship
Act,1"' which was enacted pursuant to section 3(3) of the Constitu-
tion, provides for the acquisition of South African citizenship by
birth or descent. 9'
also Van Bueren, supra note 183, at 44-45 (arguing that the privacy rights of children
should be considered in addition to the rights of adults).
185. Examples of such legislation are the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950;
Proclamation 123 of 1967; Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; and Reservation of Separate
Amenities Act 49 of 1953, amended by Acts 10 of 1960 and 38 of 1972. The Separate
Amenities Act was repealed by Act 100 of 1990. Discriminatory Legislation Regard-
ing Public Amenities Repeal Act 100 of 1990.
186. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, arts. 7, 8.
187. S. AFR. CONST. § 3(1).
188. Id. § 3(2) (emphasis added).
189. Id. § 3(3).
190 South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995.
191. Id. Section 2 confers South African citizenship on any person who acquired
South African citizenship by birth prior to the commencement of the Act; who is
born in the Republic on or after the commencement of the Act; or who is born out-
side the Republic and one or both of his parents, or his mother if he is born out of
wedlock, was at the time of his birth in the service of the Government of the Republic
was a representative or employee of an employer resident in the Republic, or was in
the service of an international organization of which the Government of the Republic
was a member. Id. § 2.
Section 3 confers South African citizenship by descent on any person who,
immediately prior to the commencement of the Act, was a South African citizen by
descent; or who is born outside the Republic on or after the commencement of the
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The Constitution and the South African Citizenship Act use
the term "citizen."'9 2 Section 28(1)(a) of the Constitution, which bor-
rows heavily from the U N Convention on the Rights of the Child,
uses the term "nationality."' 93 The difference has no policy implica-
tions. The terms "nationality" and "citizenship" may be used
interchangeably because in practice they refer to the same notion."'
"Nationality" is an international law term which describes the legal
relationship between a state and an individual for purposes of inter-
national relations, whereas "citizenship" is a constitutional law term
that describes the legal relationship between a state and an individ-
ual for the purposes of their internal relations.9
F. Section 28(1)(b): The Right to Family Care, Parental Care, or
Appropriate Alternative Care When Removed from the Family
Environment
Section 30(1)(b) of the interim Constitution provided for the
child's right to "parental care;"'9 however, it was unclear whether
the right to parental care included the child's right to be cared for by
the extended family or to foster care or adoption.'9 Section 28(1)(b)
of the final Constitution resolves this ambiguity by making specific
reference to the child's right "to family care or parental care, or to
appropriate alternative care when removed from the family envi-
Act and one of his or her parents was a South African citizen and the child's birth is
registered in terms of section 13 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992;
or whose parent has been granted a certificate of the resumption of previous South
African citizenship and such child has entered the Republic for permanent residence
prior to becoming a major and his or her birth must be registered within one year of
issue of the certificate or such longer period as the Minister may approve; or to a
person who is adopted by a South African citizen and his or her birth is registered
under section 13 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992. Id. § 3.
192. Id.; S. AFR. CoNsT. §§ 3, 19, 20, 21, 22, 47, 174, 193. But see § 28 (using
"nationality").
193. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1)(a).
194. In practice, the terms usually are used interchangeably because those persons
with the citizenship of a particular state usually hold that state's nationality. A dis-
tinction between the terms sometimes was made in a colonial context whenever a
colonial power was not prepared to afford all its subjects equal status. In South
African law, however, no distinction is made between citizenship and nationality.
All South African citizens also have South African nationality. The reference to
nationality in the provision on children's rights has no practical implications. I.M.
RAUTENBACH & E. F. J. MALHERBE, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 43, 43-44 (2d ed. 1996).
195. Tshwete v. Minister of Home Affairs, 1988 (4) SA 586, 614 (A); RAUTENBACH
& MALHERBE, supra note 194, at 43.
196. S. AFR. CONST. § 30(1)(b) (1993) ("Every child shall have the right... to
parental care....").
197. Mosikatsana, supra note 28, at 130-31; see also Mosikatsana, supra note 179, at 163.
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ronment."'' 8 This formulation is helpful because it clearly identifies
protected rights.
1. Family Care
The right to "family care" includes the right to be cared for by
the extended family. The South African common law and statute
recogni zed only the nuclear family." For example, in Bethell v.
Bland,2 the maternal grandfather brought an application for the
custoddy of a child born out of wedlock whose mother was still a
minor. The paternal grandparents brought a counter application,
and the natural father intervened.2 In his decision Judge Wunsh
referred to the natural father and the maternal and paternal grand-
parents as third parties or outsiders who lacked an inherent right to
the custody of the child.20 However, it was found that the biological
relationship and genetic factors placed the natural father in a favor-
able position over other "outsiders." '
Though the right to family care is framed in child-centered
terms, it comports with a fundamental norm of indigenous law:2"
recognition of the extended family.20 The inclusion of the extended
family under the right to "family care" in section 28(1)(b) of the Con-
stitution is a welcome improvement, and it is consistent with current
law reform efforts aimed at including the extended family in pro-
viding for the child's welfare. Acknowledging that the common
law position of granting the parents exclusive rights of access is
198. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(l)(b).
199. Mosikatsana, supra note 28, at 120-21.
200. 1996 (2) SA 194 (W).
201. Id. at 196.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 209.
204. Id.
205. This has been articulated by T.W. Bennett:
In certain instances construction of a basic right in terms of African
cultural norms would not amount to a limitation, but rather to an
extension. The word "parental," for instance, as understood by the
common law, normally denotes a child's biological father and
mother. In the African system of kinship and family relations, how-
ever, 'parental' might include more remote kinfolk, who for social
purposes are classified as playing parental roles, an interpretation
that has the effect of widening a child's support network.
BENNETT, supra note 13, at 101.
206. Id. at 96.
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not always in the best interests of the child,2' the Law Commission
has proposed draft legislation granting the extended family the right
to seek access to the child through the courts.m The right to family
care demonstrates the possibility of implementing the Constitution's
child-centered norms through traditional legal forms.
2. Parental Care
The right to parental care includes the child's right to be cared
for by both natural parents. Most legislation2 and judicial prece-
207. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION, PROJECr 100, THE GRANTING OF VISI-
TATION RIGHTS TO GRANDPARENTS OF MINOR CHILDREN 19 (1996).
208. The legislation would provide the following:
(1) If a grandparent of a minor child is denied access to the child by
the person who has parental authority over the child, such grandpar-
ent may apply to court for an order granting him or her access to the
child and the court may grant the application on such conditions as
the court thinks fit.
(2) Any other person who alleges that there exists between him or her
and a minor child any particular family tie or relationship which
makes it desirable in the interest of the child that he or she should
have access to the child, may, if such access is denied by the person
who has parental authority over the child, apply to court for an order
granting him or her access to the child and the court may grant such
application on such conditions as the court thinks fit.
(3) The court shall not grant access to a minor child as contemplated
in subsection (1) or (2) unless the court is satisfied that it is in the best
interest of the child.
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) or (2) the court may refer any
application to the Family Advocate referred to in section 1 of the Me-
diation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, 1987 (Act No. 24 van 1987),
for investigation and recommendation.
(5) The provisions of section 4(3) of the Mediation in Certain Divorce
Matters Act, 1987 (Act No. 24 van 1987), shall mutatis mutandis apply
with regard to proceedings concerning the application by grandpar-
ents or other interested persons for access to a minor child as
contemplated in this section.
Id. Section 2 of the proposed bill is comparable to subsections 16(1), (3), and (8) of the
Canadian Divorce Act. Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3, § 16(1), (3), & (8) (1985) (Can.). For
a commentary on grandparent visitation rights in Canada, see Tshepo L. Mosikat-
sana, Third Party Parenting Rights in Custody and Access Disputes, in CHILD CUSTODY
LAW & PRACTICE 26 (James G. McLeod ed., 1992).
209. For example, section 3 of the Children's Status Act, which provides for the
guardianship of and custody of children born out of wedlock, provides
(1) If the mother of an extra-marital child is unmarried and a minor-
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dent10 does not protect the child's right to be cared for by both natu-
ral parents if the parents are unwed or married according to the
tenets of a non-Christian religion. "' The common law rule, which
denies fathers inherent rights of access to their children on the basis
of gender and marital status, is inconsistent with section 9(3) of the
Constitution.1 2 The rule denies children born out of wedlock or in
non-Christian marriages access to their natural fathers, which
amounts to discrimination on the basis of the circumstances of a
person's birth under the Constitution. 3
In an effort to bring the common law position in line with the
equality provisions of the Constitution, Parliament has passed the
Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997.214
Section 2 of the Act deals with "[a]ccess to and custody and guardian-
ship of children born out of wedlock by natural fathers. 15
Discrimination against fathers in non-Christian marriages on religious
(a) the guardianship of that child shall, unless a competent court
directs otherwise, vest in the guardian of that mother;
(b) the custody of that child shall, unless a competent court directs
otherwise, vest in that mother.
(2) If the mother of an extra-marital child is under the age of 21 years
but acquires the status of a major, the guardianship and custody of
that child shall, unless a competent court directs otherwise, vest in
that mother.
§ 3 of Children's Status Act 82 of 1987.
Section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 denied an unwed father the
right to consent to the adoption of his child. In the Fraser case, the Constitutional
Court declared this provision to be unconstitutional. Fraser v. Children's Court, 1997
(2) SA 261, 263 (CC). For a commentary, see Mosikatsana, supra note 179, at 152.
210. See, e.g., B. v. S. 1995 (3) SA 571 (A) (noting that the law does not accord
fathers' access to their illegitimate children); S. v. S. 1993 (2) SA 200 (W) (declaring
that, in the absence of official interference with parental authority, the mother has
exclusive parental authority over her child born out of wedlock); B. v. P. 1991 (4) SA
113 (T) (stating that the father of an illegitimate child must show compelling reasons
why he should be granted right of access to the child); F. v. B. 1988 (3) SA 948 (D)
(holding that the father of a child born out of wedlock has no right of access to his
child even if the parents had been living together at the time of birth); W. v. S. 1988
(1) SA 475 (N) (holding that the father of an illegitimate child has no prima facie right
of access to the child); F. v. L. 1987 (4) SA 525 (W) (holding that a father of an ille-
gitimate child has no parental authority and no right of access to the child). But see
Van Erk v. Holmer, 1992 (2) SA 636 (W) (holding that the best interests of the child
dictate equal treatment for fathers of legitimate and illegitimate children).
211. See, e.g., Chodree v. Vally 1996 (2) SA 28 (W) (noting that the father of a child
not born of a marriage recognized by civil law had no inherent right of access to the
child).
212. S. AFR. CoNsT. § 9(3); see also supra text accompanying note 180.
213. S. AFR. CONST. § 9(3).
214. § 2 of Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997.
215. Id. § 2.
SPRING 1998]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
grounds is contrary to section 15(1) of the Constitution.216 Section
15(1) eliminates any legal basis for the discrimination between
fathers in Christian marriages and fathers in non-Christian mar-
217riages. Section 15(3) enables parliament to pass legislation
authorizing the recognition of non-Christian marriages. 21' Exercis-
ing this power, Parliament has introduced the Births and Deaths
Registration Amendment Act, which was assented to on August
29, 1996, and took effect on September 5, 1996.219 The Act amends
the principal Act in section 1 so as to define "child born out of
wedlock" and to make provision for the recognition of customary
unions and non-Christian marriages.m Similarly, section 1(d) of the
Child Care Amendment Act has amended the definition of mar-
riage to include customary unions and non-Christian marriages,2'
and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act m also has extended
the definition of family to include "the employee's spouse or any
other person who cohabits with the employee [and] the employee's
parent, adoptive 1arent, grandparent, child, adopted child, grand-
child or sibling." In Fraser v. Children's Court,2 Judge Mahomed
noted that the discrimination against fathers in non-Christian mar-
riages is no longer valid.m
The right to parental care is the child's right, not the parents'
right.=6 Where the parents are married according to a civil or Chris-
tian marriage, some legislative attempt has been made at
recognizingparental rights through the notion of joint parental re-
sponsibility. Parenting rights and the right to family life have not been
constitutionalized in South Africa. There is no provision in the South
African Constitution like section 14(3) of the Namibian Constitution,
216. "Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief,
and opinion." S. AFR. CONST. § 15(1).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 15(3).
219. Births and Deaths Registration Amendment Act 40 of 1996.
220. Id.
221. § 1(d) Child Care Amendment Act 96 of 1996.
222. §§ 43-48 Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1998.
223. Id. § 28(5).
224 Fraser v. Children's Court, 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC).
225. Id. at 273.
226. DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 50, at 186.
227. For example, section 1(1) of the Guardianship Act 192 of 1993 grants both
parents equal rights to the guardianship of their children. Sections 6(3) of the Divorce
Act 70 of 1979 and 5(1) of the Matrimonial Affairs Act, as amended by section 16 of
the Divorce Act, empower the courts to grant joint custody orders where appropri-
ate. For an interpretation of these provisions where joint custody was denied, see
Pinion v. Pinion, 1994 (2) SA 725 (D); Schlebusch v. Schlebusch, 1988 (4) SA 548 (E). For
an interpretation where joint custody was granted, see Venton v. Venton, 1993 (1) SA
763 (D); Kastan v. Kastan, 1985 (3) SA 235 (C) (granting joint custody).
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which provides for the protection of the family as the basic unit of
society.2 The constitutional protection of the right to family life
creates obstacles to State intervention on behalf of children and
women who are being abused, and interferes with the goals of a
child-centered approach.
3. Alternative Care
The right to alternative care includes the right of a child to
adoptive, foster, or institutional care.
a. Adoptions
The child's right to adoptive care is provided for in section 20
of the Child Care Act. 29 Section 20 provides that, upon adoption, the
adoptive child becomes the lawful child of the adoptive parents as
though the child had been born to those parents during a lawful
marriage m The right should be viewed as the child's right to be
cared for by the adoptive parents and not as the prospective adop-
tive parents' right to adopt; however, the right has not always been
intepreted in this manner.
In Fraser, the mother of an extra-marital child arranged for the
child's adoption before the child was born.2' Mr. Fraser, the child's
natural father, brought an unsuccessful application in the Witwa-
tersrand Local Division of the High Court to prevent the adoption
from proceeding.z2 On appeal to the Constitutional Court, Judge
Mahomed declared that section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act, which
denied unwed fathers the right to consent to or veto the adoption of
their natural children, was unconstitutional because it discriminated
unfairly against unwed fathers on the basis of their gender and mari-
tal status.
The Constitutional Court decision in Fraser was parent-centered
and only addressed the competing property interests that the natural
parents had in their natural child. Judge Mahomed did not consider
what was in the child's best interests. Section 28(2) of the Constitution
instructs that "[a] child's best interest is of paramount importance in
228. Gretchen Carpenter, Possible Amendments to the 1996 Bill of Rights-What,
Where and Why?, 1 HUM. RTS. & CONST. L.J. OF S. AFR. 9 (1997).
229. § 20 of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
230. Id. § 20. See BOSMAN-SWANEPOEL & WESSELS, supra note 18, at 56-57.
231. Fraser v. Children's Court, 1997 (2) SA 261,266 (CC).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 273-74; see Mosikatsana, supra note 179, at 152.
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every matter concerning the child." Thus, the child's right to
adoptive care should not be subordinated to the potentially com-
peting property interests of the natural parents in their child, as
happened in Fraser.m This decision is another demonstration of the
unwillingness among many in South Africa to embrace a child-
centered approach.
b. Foster Care
Section 15(b) of the Child Care Act provides for the placement
of children into foster care.2 Section 290(1)(b) of the Criminal Proce-
dure Act provides for the placement of convicted juveniles in foster
care.237 This legislation creates the basis for recognizing a child's
right to foster care.
It is conceivable that there may be situations where a foster
parent and child may form a psychological bond or where continued
foster care would be in the child's best interest. This situation would
usually occur when the foster child is a member of the family or
where the foster child has been in care for an extensive period of
time. Section 18(4)(g) of the Child Care Act mandates the approval of
any adoption of a foster child by the foster parents, who in some
cases are the only "psychological parents" some children have.'
Such a statement shall be dispensed with if it is not forthcoming
within a month. The requirement for such a statement is merely a
gesture of courtesy, as no child shall be excluded from adoption
under circumstances where adoption would be in the child's best
interests' 9 It could be argued that some foster parents may invoke
their due process rights contained in section 33 of the Constitution in
234. S. AFR. CONSr. § 28(2).
235. 1997 (2) SA at 273-74.
236. § 15(b) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
237. § 290(1)(b), (d) of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. See BOSMAN-
SWANEPOEL & WESSELS, supra note 18, at 44-45.
238. § 18(4)(g) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983. The section reads:
A children's court to which application for an order of adoption is
made... shall not grant the application unless it is satisfied... in the
case of an application for the adoption of a foster child by a person
other than his foster parent, that the foster parent consented in writ-
ing to the adoption of the child: Provided that such consent shall not
be necessary if the foster parent refuses or fails, within one month
after being called upon in writing by an assistant of the children's
court to do so, to indicate to him in writing whether he so consents or
not.
Id.
239. BOSMAN-SwANEPOEL & WESSELS, supra note 18, at 53.
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asserting the right "not to be deprived by state action of the care of a
child with whom they have established a stable relationship 'except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
In the United States of America, the courts have not been con-
sistent in deciding whether to accord due process protections to
foster parents before allowing the removal of the child by welfare
officials, even where there was a family bond between foster parent
and child. In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform,24' the court decided, without determining whether the foster
care relationship created a constitutionally protected liberty interest,
that New York procedures were adequate to protect whatever liberty
interest the foster parents might have.24 Several U.S. courts have
decided that there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in
the relationship between a child and his or her foster parents.243 Con-
sequently, due process need not be fulfilled before a state welfare
agency removes the child from the foster home. However, in Rivera
v. Marcus,24 the court stated that:
there would appear to be instances in which a liberty in-
terest should be recognized where long-term family
relationships evolve out of foster home placements. It
seems clear that, as with a biological parent and child,
strong, loving, emotional and psychological ties can de-
velop among members of a long-term foster family.
240. Nicholas Bala & J. Douglas Redfearn, Family Law and the "Liberty Interest":
Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights, 15 OTrAWA L. REV. 275, 292 (1983)
(discussing rights under a similar provision of Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms) (quotation marks omitted).
241. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
242. Id. at 855. The Smith court stated:
Finally, the § 392 hearing is available to foster parents, both in and
outside New York City, even where the removal sought is for the
purpose of returning the child to his natural parents. Since this rem-
edy provides a sufficient constitutional pre-removal hearing to
protect whatever liberty interest might exist in the continued exis-
tence of the foster family when the State seeks to transfer the child to
another foster home, a fortiori the procedure is adequate to protect
the lesser interest of the foster family in remaining together at the ex-
pense of the disruption of the natural family.
Id.; see also Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728, 742 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd 644 F. 2d
542 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that Michigan procedures for revoking home licenses
were constitutionally adequate because there is no liberty right connected to the
operation of a foster home).
243. A right to due process was denied in Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of
Family, 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600
F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979).
244. 533 F. Supp. 203 (D. Conn. 1982).
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Any arbitrary state interference with those ties surely
can result in harsh and lasting consequences to the fos-
ter child and to the foster family members. In these
special circumstances, it would seem that a preremoval
hearing which comports with constitutional standards
may be required.2'
The decision in Rivera parallels section 18(4)(g) of the Child
Care Act. It tempers parental rights with a child-centered approach
that favors taking the child from the foster parents and placing him
or her in another home, if that is in the child's best interests.
c. Institutional Care
Where a child cannot be placed with an adoptive or foster
family, he or she will be placed in a state institution. A child's right
to institutional care when removed from the family environment is
protected in pre-constitutional legislation. Subsections 15(c) and (d)
of the Child Care Act provide for the placement of children into
institutional care.246 Section 290(d) of the Criminal Procedure Act
provides for the placement of convicted juveniles in institutional
care, as provided in the Child Care Act.247
The right to family, parental, and alternative care recognizes
the importance of the family in meeting the needs of children. In
South Africa, as in most Western countries, experience has shown
that the family may be far from ideal. Unemployment, poverty, illit-
eracy, addiction, criminality, and family breakdown combine to
create a situation where children are more likely to be abused.2
Section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution protects children from maltreat-
ment, neglect, abuse, or degradation.2 49 This constitutional protection
gives added support to legislation that protects a child's right to
alternative care when removed from his or her family.
G. The Right to Be Protected from Maltreatment, Neglect, Abuse, or
Degradation
Section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution, granting children the right
"to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degrada-
245. Id. at 206.
246. § 15(c)-(d) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
247. BOSMAN-SWANEPOEL & WESSELS, supra note 18, at 44-45; see § 290(d) of
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
248. LEACH, supra note 32, at 219.
249. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1)(d).
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tion," is derived from article 19(1) of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child."' Article 19(1) requires that
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, ad-
ministrative, social and educational measures to protect
the child from all forms of physical or mental violence,
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, mal-
treatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while
in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other
person who has the care of the child. 2
Reports of the sexual abuse of children in South Africa have
increased.m On March 17, 1997, President Mandela listened to chil-
dren's concerns on the Felicia Mabuza-Suttle Talk Show. 2  The
children's major concern was the increase in incidents of sexual
abuse. s
There have been legislative attempts to deal with the problem
of the physical and sexual abuse of children. For example, the Sexual
Offenses Act 23 of 1957 criminalizes sexual intercourse with mi-
nors.5 The difficulty with most child protection laws, however, is
that they do not define clearly what constitutes ill-treatment, neglect,
250. Id.
251. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 19(1).
252. Id.
253. The importance of the problem is evidenced by the fact that in August 1996,
Minister of Welfare and Population Development Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi deliv-
ered a message from Nelson Mandela concerning the commercial sexual exploitation
of children to the World Congress Against Sexual Exploitation of Children. Nelson
Mandela, Statement to the World Congress Against Sexual Exploitation of Children
(Aug. 27, 1996). In a recent press release, Human Rights Watch Women's Project and
Human Rights Watch/Africa called on "the South African government to intensify
its efforts to protect women from violence and to improve the state's response to
such abuses, with particular attention to the medico-legal system" Human Rights
Watch Women's Project and Human Rights Watch/Africa, Press Release (Aug. 13,
1997). The organizations report that
[o]f the 27,056 rapes reported in 1993, only 8,998 were prosecuted; of
the cases brought to court, 4,753 resulted in convictions, just 17.5% of
the total. Since 1993, the number of rapes reported has nearly dou-
bled, to 50,481 in 1996; of these 21,863 were prosecuted, yet only
4,100 led to a conviction, or 8.1% of the cases reported. While the per-
centage of cases has increased, the rate of conviction has fallen.
Id.; see also BINAIFER NOwROEE & BRONWEN MANBY, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN
SOUTH AFRICA: STATE RESPONSE To DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE (1995); Neil Van
Dokkum, The Statutory Obligation to Report Child Abuse and Neglect, 1996 ACTA
JURIDICA 163, 179 (stressing that child abuse is a growing problem in South Africa).
254. Felicia Mabuza-Suttle Show (SABC television broadcast, March 17, 1997).
255. Id.
256. § 14 of Sexual Offenses Act 23 of 1957.
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or abuse. This lack of definition results in class, cultural, and moral
biases in the reporting and enforcement process."'
Section 42(1) of the Child Care Act placed an obligation on
dentists, medical practitioners, nurses, and social workers to report
child abuse. s8 Section 42(1) of the Child Care Act was limited in its
reach in that it restricted the responsibility for reporting child abuse
to specific health professionals and social workers, while excluding
other professionals who would come into contact with children, such
as mental health professionals, teachers, day care workers, and
priests.2 59 Section 42 has now been amended by the Child Care
Amendment Act to include teachers or "any person employed by or
managing a children's home, place of care or shelter."2
Section 4 of the Prevention of Family Violence was enacted in
an effort to remedy the deficiency that existed in Section 42 of the
Child Care Act prior to its amendment in 1996.261 Section 4 of the
Prevention of Family Violence Act obligates "[a]ny person who ex-
amines, treats, attends to, advises, instructs or cares for any child" to
report the ill-treatment of such child to the police, the Commissioner
of Child Welfare, or a social worker.26
Chapter 3 of the Child Care Act provides mechanisms for the
removal of abused or neglected children from their families to
places of safety.2m Sections 11 and 12 of the Child Care Act em-
power police officers, social workers, and other authorized persons
to remove children from their homes to places of safety, with or
257. See, e.g., A. v. R. Kinder-en-Kindersorgvereniging, 1996 (1) SA 649 (T)
(discussing a situation where an investigator of child abuse reported no cause for
concern after making only a cursory investigation); see also N. Van Dokkum, The
Statutory Obligation to Report Child Abuse and Neglect, 1996 ACrAJURIDICA 163, 175-77
(describing underreporting of child abuse in White middle-class families).
258. § 42(1) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
259. Id. See Van Dokkum, supra note 257, at 171-72.
260. § 15(a) of Child Care Amendment Act 96 of 1996.
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, every dentist,
medical practitioner, nurse, or social worker or teacher, or any per-
son employed by or managing a children's home, place of care or
shelter, who examines, attends or deals with any child in circum-
stances giving rise to the suspicion that that child has been ill-treated,
or suffers from any injury, single or multiple, the cause of which
probably might have been deliberate, or suffers from a nutritional de-
ficiency disease, shall immediately notify the Director-General or any
officer designated by him or her for the purpose of this section, of
those circumstances.
Id.
261. § 4 of Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993.
262. See id.; Van Dokkum, supra note 257, at 172-73.
263. §§ 10-16 of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
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without a warrant.2" The forcible entry of premises is also allowed.'
Certain circumstances may require removal of children from abusive
situations, however, actions taken pursuant to sections 11 and 12
may give rise to constitutional challenges based on the infringement
of the right to privacy.2 "
Section 14 of the Child Care Act sets out criteria for the removal
of children from their homes.27 Under the original version of the Act, a
finding of parental guilt was required. This requirement was unsatis-
factory because the parent or guardian had to be unable or unfit to
have custody of the child.2" Fortunately, section 14(4)(b) has been
amended to give it a child-centered focus.2" A finding of parental guilt
is no longer required.m Insofar as it only requires a "child in need of
care," the amended Act operates on child-centered criteria. 1
The criminal trial process also has been reformed to enable child
witnesses who are victims of abuse to testify against their abusers in a
non-intimidating and child-friendly setting. Section 170A of the
Criminal Procedure Act has reformed the criminal trial process to
enable child complainants to give evidence in court against their abus-
ers without all of the harshness of the adversarial process.' This
provision makes it possible for children to give evidence by video link
or from behind a one-way mirror as long as the accused can observe
and hear the child witness. This provision also makes it possible for
cross examination of child witnesses to be conducted through an inter-
mediary.273 In Klink v. Regional Court Magistrate,24 the constitutionality of
providing for the questioning of a child witness through an intermedi-
ary was challenged.m There the Court decided that
lilt is ... possible that the forcefulness and effect of
cross-examination may, to some extent, be blunted
when an intermediary is interposed between the ques-
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Van Dokkum, supra note 257, at 247.
267. § 14 of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
268. Id.
269. § 5 of Child Care Amendment Act 86 of 1991 (amending § 14 of Child Care
Act 74 of 1983).
270. Id.
271. Id. § 5(b).
272. § 170A of Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
273. Karen Mfiller & Mark Tait, The Child Witness and the Accused's Right to Cross
Examination, 3 J. S. AFR. L. 519, 526-30 (1997); see also P.J. Schwikkard, The Abused
Child: A Few Rules of Evidence Considered, 1996 ACTA JURIDICA 148, 155-62 (describing
the Act's effect on the adversarial nature of the trial).
274. 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE).
275. Id.
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tioner and the witness. But this does not mean that the
accused is denied the right to a fair trial, for in deciding
whether his rights have been violated it is also neces-
sary to take into account the interest of the child
witness.7 '6
Advances in technology, such as the Internet, have made it
even more difficult to detect and report child sexual abuse. The na-
ture of interaction on the Internet, particularly the anonymity of the
user, has made it possible for children to access pornographic mate-
rials and to interact with adult users. The South African lawmakers
and educators need to be aware of the negative potential of the In-
ternet, and they need to place controls on the accessibility of sexual
materials to children and prohibit child pornography on the Inter-
net.'
IV. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND FAMILY AUTONOMY
Child-centered approaches to rights discourse are often op-
posed by adults who perceive children's rights as extraneous and
inconsistent with family or parental autonomy.28 Parent-centered
approaches, which seek to insulate the family from state interfer-
ence, are premised on the public/private dichotomy.27 Because the
family performs a public function by rearing children, it is inaccu-
rate to view the family as operating outside the public sphere.m°
Non-regulation would reinforce existing inequalities in parent/child
relations and idealize the family as a safe haven for children. 1
Where families fail to meet their obligations towards their children,
it is appropriate for the state to interfere. Accordingly, section
28(1)(c) empowers the state to protect the child's right to basic nutri-
tion, shelter, basic health care, and social services.
276. Id. at 411-12.
277. L. C. Haupt, Children Exploring Cyberspace: Protecting Children Against the
Dark Side of the Internet (visited Apr. 19, 1998) <http://members.smartnet.co.za/
-wybrand/LIEZL.html>. But see Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (ruling the
U.S. Congress's attempt to criminalize transmission of non-obscene, indecent mate-
rial to children a violation of constitutional protections of freedom of speech).
278. LEACH, supra note 32, at 204.
279. Bainham, supra note 81, at 206; see also GImrrNs, supra note 81.
280. Eekelaar, supra note 83.
281. Lasch, supra note 84.
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A. The Right to Basic Nutrition, Shelter, Basic Health Care, and Social
Services
The right to nutritional well-being, shelter, health, and social
services is recognized in international law, in article 24(2)(c) and
(e)' 2 and article 27(3)B of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Section 30(1) of the interim Constitution provided for the
right to "security, basic nutrition and basic health and social serv-
ices."2 The reference to security was unnecessary in view of the
protection of the right to "security of the person" already granted
under section 11 of the interim Constitution. This confusion has
been cleared in section 28(1) of the Constitution by the deletion of
any reference to the right to security.2 Section 28(1)(c) provides that
"[elvery child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health
care services and social services. ' w
Both international human rights law and municipal law rec-
ognize that the implementation of economic, social, and cultural
rights are subject to resource constraints and will be achieved only
over time. For example, article 4 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child refers to the obligation of state parties regarding economic,
social, and cultural rights to "undertake such measures to the maxi-
mum extent of their available resources."' Article 24(1) refers to "the
highest attainable standard of health." Article 28(1) explains that
282. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 24(2)(d)-(e). This article provides that the
State shall take appropriate measures
[t]o combat disease and malnutrition, including within the frame-
work or primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of
readily available technology and through the provision of adequate
nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration
the dangers and risks of environmental pollution; [and]
[t]o ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and
children, are informed, have access to education and are supported
in the use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the ad-
vantages of breast-feeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation
and the prevention of accidents.
Id.
283. Id. art. 27(3). Article 27(3) states in part that "States Parties ... shall[,] in case
of need[,] provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with
regard to nutrition, clothing and housing:' Id.
284. S. AFR. CONST. (1993) § 30(1)(c) (emphasis added).
285. S. AFR. CONST. § 11 (1993). Section 11 is now section 12 of the Constitution. S.
AFR. CONSr. § 12.
286. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(l)(c).
287. Id.
288. U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 4.
289. Id. art. 24(1).
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the "States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and
with a view to achieving this right progressively." The rights in
section 28(1)(c) of the final Constitution also are worded in a restric-
tive manner,"' referring only to basic needs and restricting rights
holders to children. 22 Human rights activists and children's rights
advocates may argue, with some justification, that "many of the
problems of violations or neglect of economic, social and cultural
rights have more to do with power relationships in society, or a lack
of 'political will,' than with resource constraints."293
Under common law' and statute,295 and even under interna-
tional law,96 parents bear the primary responsibility to provide
support for their children. The state has a positive duty to prevent
parents from infringing upon this right.29 However, where parents
fail, section 28(1)(c) of the final Constitution places the obligation on
the state to ensure the realization of this right.29 The Social Pensions
Act governs the state's obligation where parents fail to meet their
primary responsibility.2 The state provides a small monthly main-
tenance allowance scheme which is administered by the Department
290. Id. art. 28(1).
291. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1)(c).
292. de Vos, supra note 67, at 255 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted).
293. David Parker, Resources and Child Rights: An Economic Perspective, in IM-
PLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 33, 34 (James R. Himes ed., 1995).
294. VAN LEEuwEN, CENSURA FORENSIs 1.1.10.1 (1662); Union Gov't v. Warneke
1911 AD 657; Lesbury van Zyl, Maintenance, in FAMILY LAW SERVICE 1 (I.D. Schafer
ed., 1988).
295. See, e.g., Maintenance Act 23 of 1963.
296. Article 18 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child states that
"States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that
both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the
child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians have the primary responsibility
for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will
be their basic concern." U.N. Convention, supra note 9, art. 18 (emphasis added).
297. Section 50 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 and section 11 of the Maintenance
Act 23 of 1963 make it an offense for any person who fails to provide a child with
sufficient maintenance while able to do so. For instructive decisions, see State v.
Diedericks, 1972 (4) SA 266 (NC) (holding that a charge of failure to maintain can be
sustained only when a responsible person is in a posi'tion to provide maintenance for
a child yet fails to do so); State v. Boshoff, 1971 (1) SA 314 (T) (discussing a charge of
failure to maintain a child when the paternity of the child is in doubt); State v. Jeggels,
1962 (3) SA 704 (C) (upholding a father's conviction for failure to maintain his child);
see also Bridgette Clark, Children's Right To Support-A Public Responsibility?, 1996
ACrA JURIDICA 82, 93-96 (arguing that reliance on private law remedies is not effec-
tive); BOSMAN-SWANEPoEL & WESSELS, supra note 18, at 81.
298. de Vos, supra note 67, at 256.
299. Social Pensions Act 37 of 1973.
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of Welfare.' ° There are two types of grants under the scheme: a
parental allowance and a child's allowance.3'°
Following the report of the Lund Committee on Child and
Family Support, which recommended the scrapping of the R 430 per
month parental allowance and the reduction of the R 135 a month
child allowance to R 75 per month, Welfare Minister Geraldine
Fraser-Moleketi proposed legislation implementing the Lund Com-
mittee recommendations.m The Welfare Minister's plan was severely
criticized by non-governmental organizations, such as the Black Sash
and the Poverty Reduction Monitoring Services of the Institute for a
Democratic South Africa, for placing fiscal concerns above child
welfare."3 The United Nations, in proclaiming a "new ethic" as part
of the Declaration made at its World Summit on Children held in
September 1990, stated
[tihe mental and physical growth of a child cannot be
asked to wait until the interest rate falls, or until com-
modity prices recover, or until debt repayments have
been rescheduled, or until the economy returns to
growth, or until after a general election or until a war is
over .... In our time, for the first time, we have the
chance to begin shielding the lives and the normal
growth of children from the worst excesses, misfor-
tunes, and mistakes of the world into which they are
born.' 30
The parental allowance is awarded to South African Citizens
who have been resident in the country for five years!" The applicant
parent must be unmarried, divorced, or widowed.3 There is no
entitlement for a woman with children on family benefits when she
is cohabiting with a man.0 "If married, her husband must have
deserted her for over three months and be entitled to a state pension,
he must have been declared unfit for work for more than six months
300. Clark, supra note 297, at 85.
301. Id.
302. Rafiq Rohan, Minister's Grant Plan Opposed, SOWETAN, Apr. 22, 1997, at 11.
303. Id.
304. UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 27 (1991), quoted in Ian But-
ler, Children and the Sociology of Childhood, in A CASE OF NEGLECr?: CHILDREN'S
EXPERIENcES AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD 1 (Ian Butler & Ian Shaw eds.,
1996).
305. Clark, supra note 297, at 85.
306. Id.
307. Tshepo L. Mosikatsana, A Socio-Legal Analysis of the Saskatchewan Matrimonial
Property Act SS 1979, c-M6.1 from 1974-1988 (unpublished M.A. thesis University of
Regina 1989) 86-87.
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or sentenced to jail for more than three months."' ' To receive a
child's allowance, the applicant must prove that the child's father is
deceased, disabled, or has disappeared.- South African welfare
policies are based on the patriarchal family model and its assump-
tions of male dominance and female dependency. Such policies
reinforce gender inequality.
[T]he sexual exclusivity required of the wife in a tradi-
tional patriarchal marriage, which thereby guarantees
economic support, is reproduced with the state then as-
suming the husband's economic role. Where a woman is
viewed as having formed a potentially sexually exclusive
relationship with a man, the state will withdraw, thereby
transferring the economic burden that flows from the
sexual relation to this new source of support ..... The ef-
fect on the sole-support mothers is to constrict their realm
of private action and punish them economically where
they transgress the presumptions of the male breadwin-
ner model of human relationships. This attitude is more
than bourgeoisie morality; it is the strictest application of
patriarchal control to women of childbearing capacity
who otherwise exist outside a relationship with a
man.... Further, in its relation with single-mother-led
families, it actively replicates the exchange of exclusive
sexual service for economic support, on which the de-
pendency equation is based.310
South African welfare policies, like those of most Western
countries, are out of step with social reality in so far as they are
based on assumptions of female dependency and they are contrary
to the equality provisions contained in section 9(3) of the Constitu-
tion.
B. Section 28(2): The Supremacy of the Best Interests of the Child
Section 28(2) of the final Constitution announces that "[a]
child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter
concerning the child., 31 1 This principle suggests that children's best
308. Clark, supra note 297, at 85.
309. Id.
310. Margaret Leighton, Handmaids' Tales: Family Benefits Assistance and the Single-
Mother-Led Family, 45 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REV. 324, 327 (1987) (citations omitted).
311. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(2).
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interests trump all other considerations."' The best interests standard
is implicated in all matters affecting the child, such as custody, ac-
cess, and adoption. It is an indeterminate standard, and is for the
most part subject to judicial discretion. The indeterminacy of the
best interests standard has enabled the courts to interpret it in a
manner that reinforces societal prejudices in custody and access
disputes in favor of heterosexual parents over homosexual parents
13
and mothers over fathers. 4
The current constitutional context has led to a re-examination
of the judicial application of the bests interests standard as prefer-
ring mothers over fathers. For example, in Van der Linde v. Van der
Linde,31 Judge Hatting discarded the primary caretaker presumption
as anachronistic and reflective of another time.316 He explicitly fa-
vored equal parenting rights. 7 He commented that mothering is not
gender specific and that it is indicative of function rather than per-
sona. 8 A father can be just as good a "mother" as the biological
mother, and naturally a mother can be just as good a "father" as the
biological father.31 ' The quality of a parental role is not determined
by gender3 O The Van der Linde case clearly reflects the overarching
influence of the Constitution in the development of South African
equality jurisprudence and consequently, the growing influence of
the child-centered norms and values.
A reading of various legislation, such as the Child Care Act321
and the Termination of Pregnancy Act,32 points to a duality in ap-
proach when dealing with children's rights. On the one hand,
section 28(g) of the Constitution, read with sections 18(c) and 39(4) of
the Child Care Act, apply a parent-centered standard that views
children as dependent and incapable of making independent deci-
sions about their lives.3  In other words, someone makes the
determination as to what is in the child's best interests. 4 Section
312. Helen Reece, The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or Construct?, in 49
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 266 (Michael Freeman ed., 1996).
313. See, e.g., Van Rooyen v. Van Rooyen, 1994 (2) 325 (W); Mosikatsana, supra
note 28, at 114.
314. Reece, supra note 312, at 271-74.
315. 1996 (3) SALR 509 (0).
316. Id. at 514-15.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
322. Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.
323. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(g).
324. For a discussion of the best interests test, see Palmer, supra note 28, at 98; see
also Mosikatsana, supra note 28, at 119.
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39(4) of the Child Care Act restricts the right to consent to surgical
procedures to persons above eighteen years old.' Minors over four-
teen years of age can consent only to medical and non-surgical
procedures.326 Minors under fourteen years of age cannot consent to
either, as they require parental consent.3
The provisions of section 39(4) of the Child Care Act are
clearly parent-centered and are inconsistent with section 2 of the
Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996, which permits
minors, regardless of age, to consent to abortion, even against the
wishes of their parents or guardians.3' This Act promotes autono-
mous decision-making on the part of children in matters affecting
their life circumstances or health.32
CONCLUSION
Constitutionalization of children's rights in section 28 of the
Constitution marks a watershed period in the history of South Africa,
and it represents a meaningful attempt to provide a constitutional
framework for a child-centered law reform program. It also provides
a basis for challenging racially oppressive and parent-centered
apartheid laws which undermine the child's best interests. Prior to
the implementation of the Constitution, the South African welfare
policies were racially structured, patriarchal, and parent-centered.
Black children were denied basic human rights such as education,
nutrition, and health care. They were denied South African citizen-
ship under the homelands policy, and their families were removed
forcibly from their lands. They were victims of police brutality, and
they were detained for long periods without trial under conditions
that were in violation of international law.
Constitutionalization provides a basis for challenging the ra-
cially structured and parent-centered child welfare laws which are not
in the best interests of the child. For example the child's constitutional
right to nutrition contained in section 28(1) formed the basis for the
attack on Minister Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi's attempt to lower the
child allowance. It also provided the ideological basis for the Chil-
dren's National Feeding Scheme and the Children's Fund set up by
the President in furtherance of the political culture of children's rights.
325. § 39(4)(a) of Child Care Act 74 of 1983.
326. Id. § 39(4)(b).
327. Id. § 39(4); see also Charles Ngwena, Health Care Decision-Making and the
Competent Minor: The Limits of Self Determination, 1996 ACrA JURIDICA 132, 139-40
(describing the effect of § 39(4) on minors).
328. § 2 of Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996.
329. Id.
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Other rights contained in the Constitution that have succeeded in
promoting a child-centered legislative program include the follow-
ing rights 1) not to be involved in armed conflict; 2) not to be
detained except as a measure of last resort; 3) to have legal represen-
tation; 4) to be protected from exploitative labor practices; 5) to have
a name and nationality; and 6) to be protected from maltreatment,
neglect, abuse, or degradation.
